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ORGANIZING FOR PEACE

Lectures

by

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U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

WASHINGTON

1945

1887
1888

FOREWORD

THESE LECTURES on "Organizing for Peace" were sponsored by the Graduate School of the United States Department of Agriculture and were delivered between October 13 and December 8, 1944, in the Department Auditorium in Washington. Although events of war and peace have moved a long way since then, the observations made in these lectures have permanent value. For that reason, they are here reproduced for a wider audience.

The original series included an address by Sir Willmott Lewis, Washington correspondent for the *London Times*, on "The Human Bases of Permanent World Peace", and an address by Professor Jacob Viner, Professor of Economics, University of Chicago, on "Economic Foundations of Durable Peace".

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WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH JAPAN?

by

NATHANIEL PEFFER

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If one is asked, "What should be done with Japan?" he is very tempted to answer in one sentence, "Lick her! Lick her thoroughly and come home!"

Why do we ask that question? The unspoken premise behind the question is this: Whatever we do with reference to Japan after the war must have the object of assuring us that we are not going to have to go to war in that part of the world again. Unless that is the premise, unless that is our object, whatever we do in the intermediary stages, we can reconcile ourselves to having to go to war again in the Far East every 10 or 20 years. I assume, then, that such is our premise. Whatever we do will be done toward the end that we shall not have to go to war again in the Far East.

If that is our premise, then before we discuss what to do about Japan we must also take into consideration what to do about China. The two questions are inseparably related. If we need to discuss what to do about Japan, it is because of what Japan did to China. It is no longer necessary to demonstrate from diplomatic documents and similar sources that this country got into the war with Japan, got into the Asiatic war and therefore the European war, not because of any intrinsic inherent Japanese-American conflict, or because the Japanese want Hawaii. They don't. (Perhaps that is not quite true. They really want everything.) This country got into the Far Eastern conflict because of China, because Japan wanted to subdue China, to take exclusive control over China, and America has taken the position, not only now but historically, that China must be independent. And I think, speaking objectively and not out of any patriotic commitments, on that issue the United States is right. We can say now that, as it has been between this country and Japan, so it will be between this country and any other country that wants control over China—first, there will be friction, then collision. If that is true, then preliminary to what we do about Japan is the decision of what we shall do about China. To me it is self-evident that indispensable to stability in the Far East, and therefore to immunity from war in the Far East for the boys of this country, is the independence of China and the strengthening of China. Someone is supposed to have said that if Austria had not existed it would have had to be invented. In the same way one can say that if China cannot be strong out of its own inner resources somebody must make it strong.

In other words, only a strong China can prevent the resumption of the race, the struggle, the competition, the rivalry for control over China. If that is not prevented, there will again be the threat of great power over China; America will again move to check that great power, and again will be at war. That has been certain on all historical evidence. Assuming that China becomes independent and is given the means of becoming strong, what shall we do about Japan?

Now there are two questions in any political situation. I suppose on the whole you can say there are two questions in any human situation: (1) What do you want to do? and (2) what can you do? In our private lives we are acutely conscious of the second question, but we seldom apply it to international politics. We continue to argue with ourselves about how nice it would be to do certain things. The people who have been longest in the truly tragic business of international politics—the European powers—know better than that. They confine themselves to what *can* be done. And that is what I am going to do today with reference to Japan. I shall talk about what we *can* do; not what we *want* to do.

I suppose that if I were not talking professionally, and scientifically, and analytically, but talking just as a human being functioning in the lower centers, in which no doubt one usually functions, what I would want to do would be to wring the neck of every beastly Japanese. But as a civilized being I suppose I really don't want to do that, when I reflect. I suppose the state of being civilized means the application of restraints on one's instincts, so it is on the higher level that I shall try to talk tonight.

Now, what is our object? What do we want to do? If it is to bring it about that we don't want war again, then we see to it that Japan either does not want to do or cannot do the kind of thing that precipitated this war. Now, I think we are worrying unduly about Japan. This is rather curious in a people who are habitually rather morbid in their optimism. We have reason to worry about Europe, for the European situation is difficult, if not insoluble; but the Far East is simple in the sense that, although it is old historically and culturally, politically it is young. The whole system of power politics, which has been the tragedy of our part of the world for the last four or five hundred years, is relatively new in Asia. The result is that you haven't in Asia what you have in Europe, feelings, convictions, emotions, prejudices, and hates so deeply planted, so intricately inter-related, that one wonders whether anything can be done about it. That is not true in the East. The East is still politically in one dimension, not three dimensions as in Europe, or perhaps four. The East has been brought into the system of world politics very recently, within less than one hundred years. It is still

malleable, still can be dealt with; therefore, we are worried too much about Japan. We shall not have to take Japan very seriously if she is defeated, but I will discuss that later.

What then do we want to do about Japan? First, we must defeat her thoroughly, absolutely beyond possibility of recuperation for a long time! When I say that I sound, I know, like a retired, puffy colonel, bloodthirsty in his sedentary thoughts. There is a reason for defeating Japan thoroughly besides putting it beyond possibility of recuperation. The reason is this: Only thereby can you discredit the class which has run amuck, the military class. The Japanese are even more given to militarism and respect for the military caste than are the Germans. It is not out of historical character that those two countries should be allied. It is not out of psychological character that these two peoples, beyond any others, should be definitely distinguished by an utter inability to understand anybody else. I mean by that their utter incapacity to estimate how other people will react to certain stimuli. There is, of course, nothing racial or biological in this. It would be nonsense to make biological generalizations. The psychology of both can be explained by their history, their institutions, perhaps their closeness in time to feudalism.

The Japanese military classes have been omnipotent in their own country. Furthermore, they have conferred upon Japan a great deal of glory. They have given the Japanese a great deal of thrill. They have had easy but satisfying adventures in conquest, proving to the Japanese people that they are irresistible. Out of that a certain psychology has been bred in the Japanese people. Inevitably, they have come to believe that the military way of life is a successful one. And until the Japanese military caste is discredited, there is no chance of bringing the Japanese people to such a system of political conduct that it will be possible for us to live with them. That can be only when it is demonstrated that the military caste has led the country to ruin, and I mean ruin literally. It will not be enough that their sons have been killed; they will forget that. But the ruins of destruction on their own soil they will see and have to remember. As the French have had devastated areas to remember by, so will the Japanese have to remember, the more so as Japanese aggression brought on its devastation. Therefore, Japan has to be thoroughly defeated, and thus we can discredit the military caste, if only for pedagogic or therapeutic reasons. Nothing else will give the Japanese people the shock that they must have, if they are to learn that military adventure opens for them the road to ruin and that only by abandoning military adventurism can they escape ruin.

Second, we must take away all Japan's outlying territory. That must be done. We must return Japan to the status of the 80's, return

her to her home islands. Many of you must be asking yourselves how the Japanese are going to live on those little islands with their enormous population. Forget it for the moment! Or, for that matter, forget it forever and ever! The whole population question, I think, with respect to realized world politics, is a synthetic, artificial question. I think it important only in its biological and sociological aspects. Population pressure has not been the reason for Japanese aggression. Not for that reason has Japan had to try to expand. No, the Japanese must be deprived of their outlying areas, first, so that they won't have any more stepping-off points; and second, so that, returned to negligible territorial proportions, shorn of imperial possessions and imperial grandeur, they will know that conquest did not pay. Beyond that, nothing else need be done. The attempt to do anything else would be not only a fallacy but futile and, still worse, tragic in point of the cost in human lives. I ask you not to forget what is so tempting to forget after a war has gone on long enough—that wars are not fought by digits, they are fought by boys.

When men talk of doing more to Japan than crushing her in defeat and depriving her of her outlying territory, what have they in mind? Two things presumably: (1) To educate Japan out of militarism and (2) to keep her weak and disarmed. Both are desirable, no doubt, and if they could be brought about it would be providential, but I suspect that only the Creator can bring them about by fiat. Take first the question of education, and in this connection what applies to Japan applies also in a measure to Germany. Like the Germans, the Japanese must be reeducated—that is incontrovertible—but how can you reeducate a people from outside? By force? How can you educate a people by force? It is not easy to educate a people, even when they are presumably willing to receive the education; and when they are an enemy you have just conquered? Remember, no enemy ever will have been hated so bitterly, so mortally, as we shall be by the Japanese when we have conquered. For one thing, these people have never before been conquered. For another, the cumulative effect of anti-American propaganda which has been instilled for decades will have reached its height. Shall we then come as teachers, and teachers with any prospect of success for our teachings? Shall we come as conquering enemies, to teach them a doctrine of democracy, of representative government, of liberalism, and expect them to learn from us? Who, incidentally, will serve as teachers, and in what language? Do you know how long it takes a white man to learn to speak Japanese so that it does not sound comic? And who will write the textbooks and who will censor the existing textbooks, to see that all the mythology, the feudal folk

legends, are exercised? And how, even then, will you keep the historical legends from being bootlegged, secretly disseminated among the people in the privacy of their homes? The Japanese tried that in Korea and failed; the Prussians tried it in Poland and failed. It is always doomed to failure. You cannot teach people at the end of a bayonet. The surest way to prejudice the idea of democracy in the minds of the Japanese is to jam it down their throats. That would be true, not only in Japan but anywhere.

Here let me say a word about the Japanese emperor. It is extraordinary how fascinated Americans are by the Japanese emperor. In fact, we always appear to be more conscious of royalty than people are who live in monarchies. I think there has been more discussion here about what to do with the Japanese emperor than about what to do with the Japanese army. One might as well toss a coin—heads up, keep him; tails, evict him. It would make very little difference in either case. About the Japanese emperor I know very little, and I doubt whether anyone does except those immediately surrounding him. But everything one can learn about the Japanese system indicates that the emperor does not wield power; he is not the point of decision, of determination. He reigns, but does not rule. The whole business of Japanese politics is to be in the position to give him advice, which he generally takes, and probably has to take. The men in the dominating groups in Japan, not the emperor, are the ones who matter. You could keep the emperor and have a fairly liberal Japan; you could disestablish the monarchy and still have a wild, militaristic, chauvinistic, dangerous Japan. If I had to make the decision, I would leave the question of the emperor to the Japanese themselves. Besides, you have to. What else can you do? Suppose you send a detachment of United States Marines to seize the whole imperial family and move it to Chicago. Shall we then sit in Japan forever to see that the Japanese do not restore a monarchy? Also, do you want to make the Japanese emperor an eternally sacred figure to the Japanese people? Then let us, Americans—conquerors—depose him! That will make him live forever in the Japanese mind as a symbol of the country's ancient glory and present martyrdom.

Next to Japan's reeducation, what we think of most is how we shall get assurance that Japan will not recover. Therefore, do we not want to disarm Japan and keep her disarmed? I said before I would return to the question, How dangerous would Japan be after she is once defeated? I think she will not be dangerous. We generalize too much from the recovery of Germany after 1918. The country that was really crushed was France, not Germany, and most of all in the sense that she was biologically bled by the loss of so many of her young men, young men of the breeding age. Physically,

socially, psychologically, France never really recovered. Germany had less to recover from.

Now, why has Japan been so strong, and how did she become strong so quickly? Out of a combination of factors, partly accidental. For one thing, there was the accident that there lived in Japan at the same time in the crucial years of Japan's transformation, from about 1860 to 1900, an extraordinary group of great men who led the country through the difficult stages of modernization, and who did it quickly and remarkably. It was they who foresaw that a country could not survive in the nineteenth century without modernization, without the same social system as existed in the West. Therefore, Japan became the only country in its hemisphere, in its part of the world, to acquire strength and the means of strength. It was the only country in the East to industrialize. Japan became strong, and every other country in its environs remained unreconstructed, weak, and helpless. There it stood, a colossus on the plain—and it strode over all that lay before it. But that cannot happen again, first, because of Russia; second, because of China. Russia now extends across Asia, and China is resolved to industrialize and therefore to become strong. Japan will never again confront only weakness around herself.

Moreover, in the last 50 years that Japan has been on the rampage, destructive and dangerous, it has had a free hand because we, too, in the West have given it a free hand. We have done so in what appears to be our ineradicable passion for suicide—I mean the wars among ourselves that have all but emasculated us. While we were fighting among ourselves in our part of the world, the Japanese could do what they wanted in their part of the world. I don't think that will happen again, either, at least not for a long time. There is no assurance, of course, that we shall not have wars again. And we cannot be certain that we shall have, as we hope, an international system for maintaining law and the peace. But even so, if the Japanese are to have the free hand they have enjoyed up to now, then Russia must be made helpless, China must be made helpless, Great Britain must be made helpless, America must be made helpless. That might happen to one or two, or perhaps even three of them, but to all four? It is hardly likely.

It must not be forgotten that Japan cannot be defeated at all, will not acknowledge defeat, until it has been pounded into helplessness. We shall not have to go into Japan to destroy her big armament plants; they will already have been destroyed by us. We shall not have to remove her economic structure; it will already have been removed by our bombs and guns—in the Japanese homeland and in Manchuria. Japan will be left a hollow shell at the time of

surrender or acknowledged defeat. That, too, will handicap her recovery for a long time.

It is said that we must prevent the recovery of Japan's industry, must prevent the reestablishment of large industrial establishments, so that she cannot rearm. I think it will be granted that if a country has large, modern, efficient plants, it can use them for the making of tanks and planes and guns. In fact, if a country has any kind of machine industry, it can arm. There is nothing in our productive system, nothing in our social system, indeed, that does not contribute to war. There is a certain risk, then, if Japan is allowed to resume industrial production; therefore, the argument is made that we must occupy Japan or supervise its industrial production in some other way, in order to make sure that it is not arming.

If we really want supervision over Japan's production to make sure it doesn't rearm, there are only two ways to bring it about: (1) Sit there; put enough troops there to police the country, to inspect every factory, to close any factory not making simple consumer's goods. (2) Devise a system for supervising and checking every article or commodity imported into Japan or exported from Japan, because Japan has insufficient raw materials and, if it cannot import them, it cannot rearm.

Now what do these mean? Do you realize what is required to police a country like Japan, a country of 75,000,000 warrior people—a difficult country, broken by mountains and gulleys and lakes, a coast line with hundreds of little indentations? I shall put it conservatively—I shall say 300,000 American troops would have to be stationed in Japan for years; actually, I think it would mean 500,000. And those 300,000 or 500,000 would be steadily, systematically reduced by the worst guerilla resistance that men have ever known. You know what the F. F. I. did in France—and remember, Germany is on France's border. That is as nothing compared to what the Japanese guerillas could do—remember we are an ocean's width away. Hundreds of thousands of Japanese guerillas could be hidden in the little valleys within a 50-mile radius of Tokyo. We would be fighting guerilla actions daily, hourly, and the attrition would be more costly to us than to them. I repeat, we know what the Japanese did at Attu, at Saipan, at numerous other Pacific islands; we know how they fought to the last man when they were doomed, when no help could come to them. What, then, would they do at home, with a whole population in which to hide, by which to be fed? The whole prospect is appalling—and fantastic.

Now, I do not want to exaggerate. I do not want to contribute to the hara-kiri myth. The Japanese passion for suicide is not ineradicable. It is not true that when a Japanese clerk comes home in

the evening from his office, he sighs to his wife, "Oh, dear! Oh, dear! Another day, and I haven't committed suicide!" In cold fact, the incidence of suicide in Japan is lower than in many European countries. But the Japanese are a warrior people and the tradition of fighting to the death is deeply implanted. All people fight for their homes. The Chinese, by no means a warrior people, kept hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops engaged in guerilla activity. Let there be no illusion—the occupation of Japan to prevent rearmament would mean allotting to Japan hundreds of thousands of young Americans for years, for decades, in mean, dangerous duty—and thousands, tens of thousands of them, would never come back.

The only alternative to occupation that has been urged is supervision of Japan's imports to make sure that she does not bring in raw materials useful to armaments. In that way we could keep her from building planes, for example. There is something to be said for the logic of this. Japan itself has few natural resources. Check its imports of steel, iron, copper, nickel, aluminum, and other metals and minerals, and you can keep down its production of arms. But what does this mean? There are just two ways of supervising Japan's imports. The first is to keep our own inspectors at every port of entry in Japan—and Japan has a coastline of several thousand miles—and also to keep enough of our troops there to guard the inspectors from assassination. But remember, there is a long, indented coastline, a kind of rum-runners' paradise, and the Japanese are marvelous seamen with small craft; no harder inspection job ever would have been given to men. All Japan would be organized to frustrate our inspectors or to kill them. And we would have to sit there to protect them. That hardly seems practical.

The second method of supervision is at the points of departure for Japan. This would mean having inspectors at every great trading port—at Shanghai, Hong Kong, Tientsin, Singapore, Batavia, Soerabaja, Bangkok, Rangoon, Calcutta, Colombo, Bombay, Cape Town, Genoa, Naples, Marseilles, Le Havre, Antwerp, Southampton, Liverpool, Bremen, Hamburg, New York, Boston—where not, in fact? And in each country there would have to be a system of export licensing, so that nothing could be sold and shipped to Japan without official permission, and the inspectors would have to check the shipments with the permits. This could not be escaped, because there would have to be a check on indirect sales—sales to Japan from Germany, say, through Chile, or Mexico, or Thailand. In other words, you would have to institute governmental control of all foreign trade everywhere. Maybe you should, for other reasons, even more fundamental than control of Japanese armament; but that hardly comports

with ideas of free enterprise held by most of those who also want to control Japan's industry.

In short, all this is doubtless desirable, but also infeasible, there is little use in arguing about it. Where does it leave us, then, with respect to Japan? I believe there is nothing we can do except defeat Japan, leave it crushed, and shear its outlying territorial possessions from it. That gives us no absolute certainty that Japan will never again arise to be a menace; but I don't believe you can ever have that assurance with respect to Germany, or any other country. Certainly I do not see how any nation can be outlawed permanently, and I don't believe it should be. I think that if and when the Japanese give evidence, unmistakable and convincing evidence, of good behavior they should be reincorporated into good society and helped. Outlawing any people too long will make them professional criminals; they have nothing to lose.

There is even ground for hope with respect to Japan. There have been in Japan in recent years some sign of change. It is embryonic, germinal only; but I think it exists. I mean change in the direction of modernism of idea, as well as production, in the direction of more democratic check on militarism and absolutism; change toward representative government, that is, government by consent. It is still beneath the surface, it is weak, but I think it is there. We would kill that germ if we went in as conquerors, but if we let the normal course continue it will gather momentum.

After all, the Japanese have been brought into modern society. Technologically and economically, they are in the modern world. On the whole, they now live their physical lives as we do ours. They have their wireless apparatus, their telegraph, turbines, and power. The whole stream of modern influences is playing on them. They have had one lesson now, and nothing is so conducive to wisdom and good behavior as a lesson that comes with suffering. Perhaps that is the way the human animal is constituted. He doesn't learn anything except by suffering. Then he gets wisdom, especially the wisdom of restraint. I think the Japanese are going to learn; I rather think another tide will be set in motion out of its own inner forces. No doubt it will take time. We should not deceive ourselves about that. We should not expect too much soon in the way of Japanese liberalism.

Please do not misunderstand me. I am not talking the conventional talk about Japanese liberals and liberalism. We have rather made fools of ourselves in this country on that score. For years the two principal Japanese articles of effort to this country were silk and liberals, both for American consumption—upper-middle-class consumption. The liberals circulated among American upper-middle-

class intellectuals, the class that has so much influence in making opinion, among academic people (perhaps the most gullible), among leisure-class women, among the groups with high ideals and maybe low sophistication. And they disseminated a good deal of nonsense and a good deal of dishonesty. They were fraudulent liberals—liberals for export, for American consumption. I am not thinking of them, and do not want to. Unfortunately, too, they were in the huge majority in Japan. But there have been genuine liberals in Japan, too; not many, of course, and most of those had to remain silent for their own safety; but they existed, and the spirit they expressed exists—though, I repeat, in germ only. Given encouragement, I think this liberalism will grow. Defeat will be its greatest encouragement. The military caste will have been discredited. Dictatorship will have brought the country ruin. Democracy will have been vindicated by the defeat of fascism. The terrible price of the past will breed a desire for a different future. Mostly, the military caste will have lost its prestige by its failure and by the destruction it has brought on the country. Without discrediting the military caste, there is, of course, no hope from Japan; but, I repeat, that caste will have been discredited. That and the shock of defeat may clear the ground for something new in Japan and will give the democratic forces an opportunity such as they have not yet had.

In any case, I, for one, am counting on Japan's being helpless for a long period—30 years certainly, perhaps 40 or 50. In that period there will be time to see whether the new spirit establishes itself, whether Japan can be modern in government, in the spirit of its rule, as well as in production and armament. Even if not, it will not be in a position to threaten us in that interval. And in that interval, too, one prefers to hope that we on our side will have evolved and securely established some international system, some mechanism, some organization, under which the conduct of every nation, insofar as it affects international relations, is subject to some international jurisdiction or at least right of review. If that hope is realized, there would be the means of checking Japan if, contrary to every expectation, she should become both strong and dangerous in the immediate future. That would be a police action, however, an international police action. If that hope is not realized, then of course you have no choice in any part of the world; we, ourselves, become militarized and remain militarized. Then we can expect another war in another generation, and we might as well be armed to the teeth, that we may be victorious, not defeated. In that event there is little to talk about, because there is little hope for civilization.

One thing more: It is not always pleasant or easy to do justice to those against whom you feel justifiably bitter, but often it is nec-

essary. This is by way of saying that as long as the Japanese do give evidence of good behavior we must give them the right and the opportunity to trade. This is all that is required by their so-called population problem, the opportunity to buy raw materials anywhere and to sell their manufactured products without artificial handicap. With that opportunity, they can live without military adventurism; without that opportunity, they will become desperate, will have to become desperate. No people will passively go hungry. Unless we are willing to let them trade on equal terms—willing that is, to refrain from tariff measures that exclude them from markets, especially in their own part of the world—it would be better to go in and massacre half of the Japanese people, reduce them to a number which could live on agriculture and handicrafts. And no one can seriously talk about that, no matter how bitter he feels.

In short, defeat Japan, punish it now; then come home. Do not try to occupy, to reeducate, to democratize, to control its industry. Give it a chance for livelihood through continued industrialization. If and when it manifests megalomaniac notions again, act at once and forcibly, but preferably through an international organization if there is one; through old-fashioned means, if there is not. But give the new, more decent forces within Japan a chance to grow. More might be desirable, no doubt is desirable, but no more is practicable. And we are not without hope. Defeated, Japan will be negligible for a long time, and after that time may become fit for decent international society.

MILITARY FACTORS IN PLANNING FOR PERMANENT PEACE

by

HANSON BALDWIN

Military Editor of the New York Times

I would like immediately to qualify the topic assigned to me, "Military Factors in Planning for Permanent Peace," in two ways. I would like to emphasize, first, that the war isn't over. We are planning for peace in the midst of war, just as we must prepare for war in the midst of peace. We must not forget there is still a job to be done. I don't think we can reiterate that too often. We have only to look at the stalemate which exists now on the European frontier, where our armies have been held up since the first of September at the border of Germany. With bad weather setting in, it seems probable that the war in Europe will go on for quite a few months longer. In the Pacific, we need only recall that at the closest point we are today 1,500 miles from Tokyo—further from Moscow to Berlin. In the Philippines, we are now engaging in full-fledged combat with the Japanese. The events of the last three weeks show rather decisively that we are fighting the first part of the "Battle of Japan" in the Philippines. For the first time since the war started, the Jap fleet has come out and offered action. There has been a continuous flow of reinforcements, both air and ground, coming in to Leyte from Formosa and the main Japanese islands. There is a cat-and-dog battle going on in the Philippines. The war has *not* been won; there is still a war to be won.

So much for the first qualification to my title. I have a second qualification: There is no such thing as permanent peace. I say that regretfully, but at this stage of man's development, it is true. I say it advisedly, in the light of history. I say it emphatically because one of the greatest forces in the last war and in our postwar planning was the belief that World War I was a war to end all wars. That belief was bound to be, in the present stage of civilization, a false belief—one that resulted in an essentially disillusioned generation. We are still suffering from the effects of that "lost generation." We must go into postwar planning for peace with our eyes open, realizing that at the present stage of man's development we are not likely now, or for some generations, to have *permanent* peace. What we must strive for is more durable peace, for less frequency of war, while we hold before ourselves as a shining goal, centuries hence, permanent peace. There will be no such thing as *permanent* peace

in our time; not until the nature of man has been fundamentally changed by education and growth can we expect to reach the Holy Grail. With that introduction, with emphasis on the *practical* basis of a *more durable* peace, I would like to stress some things that have been done and some that may be done to try to make wars less frequent in the future.

I would like to key this talk to the practical, not to the idealistic, the unrealistic or the perfectionist, not to a Culbertson plan, to the perfect "Superstate," or to a visionary blueprint, but to the Dumbarton Oaks plan—to what is being achieved in this war, to what we are actually planning and trying to do. In planning for peace, there are international factors and domestic factors, there are long-term factors, and interim ones. We will have, after the war is over, a period of garrisoning enemy countries, of maintaining a force overseas in order to enforce the peace terms, of gradual demobilization, which will be neither peace nor war. There will be an interim period when the armed forces will have to be considerably larger than they will be ten years after peace comes, but considerably smaller than they are now. I would like to deal with that interim stage later.

I would like first to deal with the permanent long-term factors in planning for peace, with the international factors. Quite obviously, international political factors are far more important than military influences. I say the political factors are obviously more important than the purely military, because if we achieve political and economic security, military security will follow. One of the greatest problems we have in achieving economic and political security is mistrust or lack of understanding of one nation by another. Lack of understanding of one country by another is the basis of political and economic distrust today. Education is the hope of man, and the classroom must be first and foremost in teaching one nation to understand another. Education is the solid base upon which any hopes of lessening war must be built.

Dumbarton Oaks has been criticized as "an alliance," as meaningless, and it has also been presented as a certain path to the future. Let us look at it objectively between these extremes of criticism. It is by no means a perfect document, and it is not a complete document. But in its incomplete form it is the best that could be devised as a result of meetings of representatives of the three great powers, and it was evolved only after long discussion and very complete and thorough study.

Dumbarton Oaks does not promise us future economic or political security. Primarily, it is a document which depends for its enforcement upon the three great powers. There are only three great

powers in the world today, there will be only three after the war is over—Russia, the British Empire, and the United States. The strength and weakness of Dumbarton Oaks is that this is an agreement between three great powers who undertake among themselves to preserve peace. The strength is that these three great powers have the force to preserve world peace, but the weakness is that, if a crisis ever arises between the three, nothing under the sun can keep the peace.

Another criticism of the new "League of Nations" is that it promotes regionalism. If a dispute arises in some part of the world, if it is in the western part, naturally the United States will be asked to settle it, and if it is in Rumania, naturally Russia will be asked to send policing forces. And so it has been charged, and to some extent it is true, that the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement promotes regionalism or spheres of influence in the world. I don't think that is entirely correct. I think Dumbarton Oaks recognizes that spheres will exist. We must recognize that Dumbarton Oaks is not a perfect document, it is not likely to be in an imperfect world, and it does not of itself promote, guarantee, or ensure political or economic security. It can't do that. The new "League of Nations" depends primarily on the strength of the three great powers, upon how those three great powers get along together, and upon what agreements they make *outside* the framework of the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement.

Now, how, under the terms of this Dumbarton Oaks Agreement—and I want to key this discussion to the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement, because, as I have said, that is the practical application of what we are trying to do in the world today—how, under the terms of the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement, will we enforce peace militarily? As you all know, there are certain types of international police forces. There are generally considered to be three principal types. One is the so-called *ad hoc* type, consisting of national contingents from various nations, hastily assembled to do a specific job. If there should be war between two powers in Central America and perhaps in South America, the forces assigned to stop that war might be two divisions from the United States, two from Russia, two from England, two from France. Such a force would be the *ad hoc* type, police forces hastily assembled from different nations, each force representing a certain country and wearing the uniform of its own country. Such a force obviously is not truly an international police force.

Another type is the truly international force, in which the men belonging to it would wear a common uniform, have common symbols, be under a single leadership, ostensibly offer allegiance to no single nation, but only to an international security organization or "Superstate." Quite obviously that type of force is impossible today.

We may move to it by evolution, but, as I have said, we have no "Superstate" in the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement. Politically that is not found to be practical. No international police force in the purest sense of the term is provided for by the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement.

We still have a third type of force, a combination of the other two mentioned, a semi-international force. In such a force there might be a certain number of men from each nation assigned permanently, or for a certain definite period of time to the authority of the international organization, and owing allegiance ostensibly to that organization only. That would be an international type of organization, like the French Foreign Legion. If such a semi-international force were big enough to prevent aggression or to police the world, that force could be reinforced, if it became necessary for a specific operation, by national contingents drawn from armies of the United States, Russia, Britain, and other nations.

Those, loosely, are the three types of international force that can be arranged for under any type of international policing. Now, Dumbarton Oaks plainly provides for the first type, the *ad hoc* type of "national contingents." It does not provide for any truly international police force, and cannot be expected to at the present time; but other provisions of the "Oaks" Agreement might tend in time toward the evolution of a semi-international force. I would like to refer briefly to the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement. We agree with the other signatory nations, to contribute to the international security organization armed forces, facilities, and assistance. "Facilities," includes bases, supplies, and other things necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. It is provided in the draft of Dumbarton Oaks that *supplementary agreements* shall govern the numbers and types of forces and the nature of the facilities to be provided. Those agreements haven't been made yet, and no one knows exactly what we will agree to.

In addition to this provision, there has been inserted, at the instance of Russia, a passage providing that there should be held "immediately available to the organization national air force contingents for combined international enforcement" of decisions. This provision states that the strength of these contingents and plans for their use should be made by the Military Staff Committee (provided for the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement, to which I am going to refer later). This second provision acts as sort of a signpost to the future. I said the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement did not provide for any truly international police force. It does provide for *ad hoc* forces composed of national contingents from the United States Army, the United States Air Force, the United States Navy, and contingents

from other nations, acting presumably under the same common unified authority. But the second provision to which I have just referred, the one sponsored by Russia, might point to a future road to a semi-international force. Certainly it will provide air forces ready instantly to fly to any part of the world in an attempt to halt the outbreak—or spread of war, and might in time lead to setting up some international air force. That is important to remember.

The size of the contingents, as I have already stated, the sizes and types of the forces, whether sea, air, or land, battleships, foot soldiers, or planes, and the bases and “facilities” to be provided, are all to be settled by supplementary agreements among the signatory nations, after the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement itself is ratified in principle. That would mean each contributory nation—and there probably would be some 50 or more participating—would have to agree to keep in readiness a certain force which could be used for enforcement of decisions of the international authority, a force above a certain minimum and below a certain maximum in size. In other words, Dumbarton Oaks at its supplementary agreements would tend to restrict our armies and navies to a certain maximum and size; in time these agreements would develop what those maximum and minimum limits should be.

Dumbarton Oaks also provides for the establishment of a military staff committee, the functions of which would be to advise and assist the Security Council. The Security Council is the governing body of the new “League of Nations,” which is to determine who is an aggressor and whether or not that aggressor constitutes a threat to peace. The proposed military staff committee would aid and advise the Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, the regulation of armaments, and possibly in disarmament. We have precedent for this committee in the present Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, but the proposed committee would be on a far broader basis. The committee which is envisioned would have a representative from each member of the Security Council—not from all signatory nations, but from every member of the Security Council. Obviously the most important members would be the ones from the three nations that have power to enforce decisions. Where this committee would sit is not clear. That is one of the many things yet to be decided. It might sit in Geneva, as the old League of Nations did, or in Washington, or in London, or elsewhere. But it is provided in the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement that there should be regional subcommittees at various places throughout the world, if that is desired. The idea behind that provision is that an international organization has to react quickly to any threat to peace, so regional subcommittees have to be on the spot, to determine whether a threat

to peace has occurred and who the aggressor is, in order to make recommendations to the Security Council as to what ought to be done. The military staff committee or its subdivisions would also plan how the military force that would be engaged would be used; they would plan logistically for supplies, and they probably would plan strategically.

Dumbarton Oaks makes no provision, other than the section I read, regarding facilities for bases for any international force. Some agreement about air and naval bases will have to be reached in the separate agreements that are to follow and supplement the ratification of Dumbarton Oaks. No force is going to operate without bases, not even the long-ranging navy of today.

There is not much reference in Dumbarton Oaks to disarmament. The principal passage in which disarmament is mentioned includes the subject in a seemingly offhanded manner. Under the section referring to the military staff committee, the draft declares that a committee would have to be appointed to have jurisdiction over studies relating to disarmament. There is one other reference to the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament. I have previously mentioned the possibility of arriving at minimum and maximum limits for the sizes of the contingents to be put by each nation at the disposal of the international authority. It seems to me conceivable, though perhaps not probable, that if the signatory nations to this agreement agree to maintain certain minimum military forces, a certain practical maximum limit for each of the members of this organization will develop inherently and naturally. I think that is the explanation for the seeming disregard of disarmament in the present draft of the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement. It is an oblique approach to disarmament, but probably the only approach, because Russia, for instance, would not think of talking about disarmament today. Most people today in any nation, with the disarmament of 1922 in mind, would not be willing to support an agreement based on disarmament, without first knowing the shape of the postwar world. Disarmament has to follow political security; it cannot precede it.

In form the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement, as I have tried to point out, is not by any means a perfect document, but it is a very important step in planning toward more durable peace. I don't like the term "permanent peace," and I don't like to use it, because certainly if we stress permanent peace in our day, it will create disillusion, which in turn will perhaps cause isolationism when threats of war arise. After this war there will be civil wars and much disorder in many countries, and to talk about permanent peace in the same breath with a chaotic postwar world leads to self-deception. It is

too easy to set up a principle that bears no relation to the facts of the day. I think we must keep our feet firmly on the ground and recognize that there is not likely to be permanent peace in our generation; nevertheless, we must do our best to plan for *more durable* peace in a realistic, common-sense way.

Dumbarton Oaks, in summary, is an agreement between the three great powers to try to keep peace. If any one of the three great powers thinks one other of the three has violated peace, all bets are off; there is a major war. Dumbarton Oaks militarily provides that certain forces of each nation are to be placed at the disposal of a new international organization for policing purposes. In case, for instance, Mussolini were to go into Abyssinia again, this new international organization would have the right, after the Security Council had voted and had determined that an act of aggression had been committed, to seek military contingents from the United States, Great Britain, and all signatory nations. Of course, the forces closest to the scene of aggression would be used first. In practice, this will tend toward a regional application force, will tend toward the United States applying force if necessary to keep peace in South America, Britain perhaps in India and elsewhere her interests lie, Russia in Eastern Europe, and so on.

The success of the new "League of Nations" depends on getting rid of the distrust of which I spoke earlier and in understanding each other more deeply. But mutual understanding between the three great powers will be reflected in the agreements reached between those powers outside the framework of this particular Dumbarton Oaks Agreement.

Now, I think in the light of what I have said, that one of the questions that has been raised so seriously is an academic one. That question is, Should the Security Council be given the power, when it has been voted that an aggression has occurred, or a breach of peace has occurred, to use American "police" forces and commit us to action without referring each case back to Congress for approval? I think that is entirely an academic question, because, as I have just said, there will not be any great war in the world unless one of the three great powers takes up arms against another. And in that case Dumbarton Oaks is entirely a dead duck; no peace can be maintained if one of the three great powers takes up arms.

It is obvious that any American delegate on the Security Council is not going to vote to use our Army or Navy against our own country. So any operation undertaken outside the United States under the aegis of an international authority would amount to a policing operation. In the past the President has frequently handled "policing" operations of this nature without specific prior Congressional

approval. It seems that our new international security organization shouldn't be hampered by requiring, in every dispute that arises, that the American delegate on the Security Council must have not only the approval of the President but also of Congress. If we do insist upon such a requirement, we hamstring the organization by taking away its power for quick action. You can't have a debating society, you have to have power. I think a delegate who in any case is certainly going to reflect his country's opinion should be given power under the President to determine whether certain sanctions should be applied. So much for Dumbarton Oaks and what is referred to as "military force in planning for peace."

I would like to refer more briefly to some *domestic* military problems. These domestic problems also have international significance, but they do have to be decided upon at home before their influence is felt overseas. First, we have to decide what our foreign policy is going to be. We have to know what bases we are going to want under the United States flag, whether we are going to be imperialistic or isolationist, or are going to take a mean course. Today in regard to bases all we can say is that we are not going to be content in the Pacific with less than the Japanese mandated islands. Those bases are absolutely essential as connecting links to the Philippines. Whether we like it or not, whether the Philippines like it or not, we shall have future commitments in the Philippines, moral, economic, and strategic. The Philippines cannot exist alone free and sovereign, they have not the inherent power and won't have for generations. If their independence is going to be guaranteed, we are the only ones who can do it. We don't want to go through another Bataan, and the humiliation of not being able to do anything about a nation we have guaranteed to protect. In order to have access to the Philippines, we must have the Japanese mandated islands.

But one rule that must be followed in the years to come is that every step we take in our foreign policy must never exceed our ability to enforce it; we must not make commitments which we cannot back up. If we take the mandated islands, we must be prepared to hold and defend them and the Philippines against all-comers. We must put force behind the flag. We must not hobble the strength that we have by making guarantees which it is absolutely impossible for us to enforce. We must not, for instance, guarantee the independence of Korea, for we cannot possibly put an army on the Asiatic mainland to enforce such a guarantee. So, in our approach to the problem of the bases and to the new territory which may accrue to the United States after the war is over, we must be very realistic if we are to provide the basis for a more permanent peace.

Another domestic problem is bound to be the size of the armed

forces after the war and the temporary phase of unrest which follows war. About 500 thousand men and 40 or 50 thousand officers in the Navy, as compared with 80 or 90 thousand in the Navy before the war, has been suggested. The Army is talking in terms of 1 to 2 million men. It is obvious that our armed forces, if they are going to be maintained at that size, are going to present many problems—monetary problems, manpower, education and training, and equipment—which did not exist before this war. We may not need armed forces of that size; we can't determine that yet. Their size will depend on the commitments made and the policies adopted, and on how much money the American people are willing to spend in taxes.

Another military problem which will face us in the future is the organization of our armed forces. Shall we leave the Navy and War Departments as they are, or should they be merged under a single department, with an air branch coequal with the two? That is a problem of considerable importance. There is always a dynastic influence, or tendency, on the part of anyone in power to continue in power. This applies to the Army and the Navy, and to all of us; it is a natural human tendency, and we must bear in mind, I think, in planning for the better organization of our armed forces the possibility of an interservice fight, a fight for power, an interservice fight, which might hurt both the Army and the Navy and certainly would not be in the interest of sound national defense. There is some feeling between the Army and the Navy, and there is a natural human tendency for each service to wish that it might be maintained in larger strength and have more influence than the other.

The fourth major problem, which will be considered by the next Congress, is the problem of peacetime conscription, of peacetime universal service. General Marshall and the President have already espoused a system of permanent peacetime military service, and that issue will certainly come before the new Congress and be hotly discussed. Something has to be done before next May 15, when the present Conscription Act expires. We can't stop conscription with the war going on, and you also have to have conscription for 2, 3, or 5 years after the war, because we won't be able to bring back the armies for fully 2 years after the war, and some of our men may have to stay overseas and garrison enemy territory for some time afterwards.

Peacetime conscription is frequently confused as meaning an adequate program for health and physical education in our schools. But the 4-F's who were unfit for service in this war were unfit before they reached draft age, because they had health defects at an early age, and they didn't have adequate home and school training. You can't justify conscription on a health basis, or on a sociological basis. You can't have universal service trying to educate a man and at the

same time hope to make a soldier out of him, because you will get neither a good citizen nor a soldier. I think you must look upon the problem of universal military training in peacetime as a problem of whether or not it is necessary for the security of the country. Personally, I would very much like to see the decision deferred until after May 15 and have the present wartime act extended until 3 to 5 years after the war. In the meantime I would like to see more thorough and exhaustive studies made of the whole subject, before we enact a measure that will have such great consequences, sociologically, politically, and in every way on the life of our country.

I have spoken of the long-term factors in planning for peace. There are a number of short-term ones; I have time only to itemize them. There are interim factors in the period after the war is over, between the end of hostilities and the coming of a more definite peace, when our armies are still overseas and still garrisoning enemy countries. There are a number of short-term factors, which will do much to condition the type of peace and the kind of world organization we have, and the thinking of the country about the Army and the Navy. If the soldiers come home sore about the Army, I think the Army's chances of building up the effective organization which will be needed are far less than if the soldiers come back enthusiastic about it.

Demobilization is another factor. Demobilization of the armed forces has been pretty well planned by the Army and the Navy, based on the desires of the soldiers and sailors themselves. Our men have decided that the first ones who ought to be demobilized should be those with the most combat service. Demobilization "points" are to be awarded for combat service, decorations awarded for bravery and for overseas service, and, finally, the men have mentioned that they hoped the ones who had children would be among the first to be demobilized. So points for demobilization will be awarded primarily on those bases. Those three factors will govern the selection of those to be demobilized first. But it will be a long time, even when a man is put in A-1, and has four children, has seen a lot of combat service, and has a lot of decorations, before he and others like him could be transported back to this country. There will be a terrific demand on shipping in the Pacific campaign; much of it will be devoted to that ocean, and second and third priority will be given to bringing men in Europe back home.

Enforcement of peace terms is of considerable importance. We don't know what they will be, but we know we are already planning, in conjunction with Britain and Russia, to occupy Germany for an unnamed period. That occupation might go on for 3 to 5 years, the American people might become impatient, and the political consequences might be serious. If we pull out of southern Germany,

whoever comes in, it may create a problem and start moves toward another war. So we have to reconcile ourselves to staying as an occupying power as long as necessary, until Germany is rehabilitated, and that may be for a long period.

We have another problem of very great importance—the disposal of surplus and captured enemy armaments. We shall have a vast amount of planes and small ships and some land equipment to be junked after the war is over, the largest amount in history. Germany's land equipment, the Japanese navy (what is left of it), and certain elements of the Italian fleet will be of great importance in the future picture of organization of power in the world. (Some of the rifles used in the Franco-Prussian war are still showing up in revolutions in South America and Central America.

If we should turn a few German submarines or small ships over to a small power like Argentina, it might upset the balance of power in South America, although to us a few airplanes or a single ship doesn't seem of much importance. There will undoubtedly be a squabble over the spoils; already pressure is in existence. It seems to me far sounder, though you may think it wasteful, to scrap and junk to the fullest, rather than to start distributing, or dividing, or selling captured enemy equipment or surplus Allied arms to other powers. There may be a few objections to that, but not many. I would far rather see surplus planes and ships, and I would certainly rather see all captured equipment junked and destroyed than to see it sold, distributed, or divided among other nations, because that one thing will do more to upset the balance of power among smaller countries and create feuds and rivalry than anything else.

These are some of the factors and problems to be considered, in planning for more durable peace and less frequency of war.

I want to commend to you in conclusion, the battle for peace. It is a battle, which like war, requires determination and ardor, but I do commend it to you because, only if we have determination and ardor enough to thing through carefully, to work through, these very difficult problems, will we ever be able to make wars less frequent.

As Thomas Paine said more than a century ago, "We are just standing at the opening of the battle for peace." These are still "the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will in this crisis shrink from the service of our country; but he that stands it *now* deserves the love and thanks of man and woman."

GEOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS IN PLANNING FOR PEACE

by

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A geographer participating in a series of talks on planning for peace needs to ask himself: "Does the earth, which mankind has always looked to as the foundation of material existence, supply a formula for permanent peace?" The answer is, "Yes." When the entire earth becomes a single political unit, there will be no opposing sovereignties left to battle for the earth's goods. This makes the prospect for permanent peace far off, because it is already clear that the end of this war will leave the world divided into a considerable number of sovereign states. Probably the postwar political map will not look radically different from that of 1938.

A geographer, therefore, must forego the pleasure of contemplating permanent peace as a goal attainable at this time. Can he then draw from his study of the earth any prospect for a peace which, if not guaranteed permanence, should nevertheless endure for a long time? He cannot answer this question fully, because factors other than geography enter into keeping the peace. He can assert that the world now at war will not succeed in maintaining peace unless the nations take account of conditions that are either changeless or subject to very slow alteration.

The conditions most resistant to change appear to be national heredity and national environment.

I use the phrase "national heredity" to cover the traditional state of mind which may be thought of as the psychology of the national group. Recently a stimulating discussion appeared in *The American Scientist*, suggesting that national character can be profitably subjected to scientific study. That is a matter for psychologists, not geographers. Pending investigation, it seems self-evident that nations change their ways of thinking only very slowly. Enduring peace must take ample account of the national heredity.

I use the phrase "national environment" to cover the conditions that nature sets as a frame within which a nation functions. Geography deals with action and reaction of human societies in the diversified habitat provided by nature. Every group, from primitive tribe to modern nation, finds itself in a distinctive setting of climate, terrain, and natural resources. This natural environment is essentially changeless during the lifetime of the social group, except as it is modified by acts of the inhabitants themselves. Enduring peace is

unlikely, unless the distinctive environment of every nation is duly recognized by all the participating nations.

The wealth of every nation is circumscribed by its political boundaries. These limit its size, determine its shape, and hedge in the varieties of its climate, its land forms, and its natural resources. No two peoples have exactly the same environment to begin with, no two use their patrimony alike, or alter their use of the earth (as time passes) according to exactly the same pattern.

In extreme cases the environing conditions that nature imposes are so harsh that they confine the inhabitants to a narrow groove of living. This amounts to environmental control. The Eskimos have to use all their energy and enterprise to keep alive in the severe Arctic climate of their homeland. More generally, and among all the peoples who will be called upon to make and keep the peace after the current war is over, nations and individuals alike are so favored by nature that they are free to choose between several ways of using their habitat. Their environment does not control; it merely sets limits in the utilization of their territory—limits they cannot successfully transgress. The variety of choice is illustrated by comparing central, lowland China with southeastern United States. Nature has provided these two areas of about the same size with very much the same set of climatic conditions, with land forms not too unlike, and with similar natural vegetation and animal life. Nevertheless, they have evolved different agricultural practice and social order. Each has followed its own lead within the wide limits set by bountiful nature.

Not only may nations differ in the way they utilize similar regions; as time moves on they may also devise new modes of using the natural environment. Under the impact of new technology or new ideas, earth conditions may be materially altered. Forests may be cut to make way for farms, or a steel town may be built on land reclaimed from tidal flat. Man is the active agent in modifying the earth by utilizing nature's provisions in ways that shift from one era to the next.

Change in the utilization of natural endowment alters national power within the frame of the national boundaries. On this road lie scientific discoveries and technological inventions. These devices enable men to use the environment with increasing effectiveness. Less obvious, but equally transforming, is improvement in economic and political organization. For instance, the elimination of internal tariffs encourages complementary production throughout the nation; efficient government enables people to use their environment more effectively than does inefficient government. These are peaceable means of progress—all within established boundaries. They cannot reach beyond the limits set by natural resources, but those limits

expand with every improvement in application of resources to human wants.

A nation's political boundaries, even when fixed, are not simple and static. International trade agreements permit exchange, which amplifies and diversifies the resources of all the parties. Until a nation controls its needed quantity of every earth resource, it will be compelled to do business with its neighbors. So long as political boundaries separate populated areas, local devices to permit desirable international intercourse between adjacent borderlands will be arranged.

A nation may refuse to accept as fixed the political boundaries that circumscribe its area. The area occupied or controlled by a tribe or nation, and the political boundaries framing it, have generally been recognized as subject to change. On this road—expansion of the environmental base—lies a hope of incorporating new resources, a larger population, or a more favorable location. Attempted territorial expansion leads, almost invariably, to war.

Throughout history, territorial expansion has been an accompaniment to the intermittent discovery of new lands. It has gone on actively during the last 450 years, since the unfolding of the unity of the oceans enabled maritime European countries to reach out over other continents, and to dominate them all in some degree. With the close of the period of discoveries early in the twentieth century, territorial expansion has become territorial reallocation.

Recently some people have assumed that changes of boundaries should no longer occur, even at the close of a war. If that is a new idea, and it seems to be, it may have sprung from the fact that the earth contains no more undiscovered land. The world's total capacity to produce is now known in a rough way. Conceivably, the end of exploration and discovery is going to be followed by fixation of national boundaries. If so, a principal stimulus to wars of conquest will disappear.

Thus far, however, the stakes of conquest remain high. It is still true that by extending its bounds, a nation may increase its power. In the crudest terms, this occurs through addition of territory and resources. It may also occur by multiplying the ways in which peoples who were formerly separated may make joint use of their combined environments.

The chief difference between wars of earlier periods and wars of the twentieth century lies not in their instigation, but in their spread, their intensity, and their prolongation. Nowadays, war threatens the future of all nations, not merely the welfare of the loser. This is partly because any major war entangles nearly every country on earth, instead of two, three, or half a dozen nations. Partly because warfare is intense, in being carried on throughout the year, and in

continuously engaging unprecedented numbers of troops—millions instead of thousands or hundreds. Partly because it is prolonged. Even though no more time may elapse between declaration and armistice than in earlier centuries, the actual number of combat days is greatly increased because the fighting goes on without pause, winter and summer, night and day.

As a result of the scale of twentieth century wars, nations now destroy their resources at a rate so rapid that they face the permanent impairment of the national habitat. Perhaps for this reason, war is becoming pretty generally regarded in the United Nations as a disease of civilization. That view is not held by fascist nations. They are on record in recent decades as asserting flatly that the normal condition of the human being is war, and that peace is abnormal. The rest of mankind rejects this teaching, and assumes that war is a disease; conversely, that peace (which is war's surcease), can be assured only when each nation has learned to live within the frame that nature has set for it, supplemented by peaceable intercourse across political boundary lines.

Just as a person with a heart ailment may have a long and useful life if he takes care of himself and lives according to the limitations of his infirmity, so a nation can live progressively and happily without suicidal war within the limits set by geography. Any peaceable small state stands as proof of this rule. Just as the physician must observe the symptoms of his patient before diagnosing the disease and prescribing treatment, so the peacemaker must study the national symptoms that lead to war. If either palliates the symptoms, he may lose the clues to the underlying disease. Peace treaties exclusively political and economic fall into the category of palliatives, as proved by the world's experience with the agreements that ended the War of 1914-18. The result has been a crying of "Peace, peace; but there is no peace." Political and economic unrest that lead to war are symptoms of war illness. Therefore, alterations in national political and economic structure turn out to be impermanent unless they take proper account of the natural environment.

Recognition of symptoms common to many or most wars of the recent past (say 75 or 80 years), may suggest a cure for the disease, war. A comparison of these wars makes it clear that they have not all been alike.

A good deal of small-scale fighting has been incidental to keeping the peace, particularly in colonial territory, and in unsettled zones on the fringes of large states as Russia. This is a kind of policing, with effects confined to small areas. It is a concomitant of the expansion of the European mode of governance over the rest of the world. Frontier skirmishing appears to be decreasing, now that the entire earth has been brought into a single economic community.

In any case, it has little in common with such wars as the present global conflict.

Likewise internal in character are social revolutions, such as those of China and Russia. These convulse large segments of territory and population, and they have profound effects on the whole world. They appear to accompany sharp readjustments of national life from one pattern to another. Radical economic reconstruction is attended by organic changes in the established social order, and both are associated with new fashions in public thought. Such internal convulsions occur when the pattern of society has been so fixed that a fresh adaptation of the people to their natural environment has become long overdue. The only tested means of avoiding such upheavals is continuous change in government, to keep the state accordant with social and economic progress inevitable in a world in which the technique of using the earth is forever changing. Lacking constant adaptation, violent social revolution seems bound to occur at rare intervals.

Wars that break out between sovereign states fall into a different category from both border policing and social revolution. They have not the excuse of being police operations, nor the justification of being growing pains in the progress of national societies. Territory, including the natural and human resources within the area, is usually the bone of contention in wars between sovereignties. The struggle is prolonged only when the contestants are evenly matched. They may be small sovereignties, as were the Balkan States, which fought two wars just before the War of 1914-18, or they may be Great Powers, as in the Franco-Prussian War and the two world wars. Frequently large states take sides in wars started among small states. If the Great Powers become involved, such wars convulse the world and leave it poor by wasting its resources.

Whether the contestants are small or large, the shape of the struggle is much alike. One party makes moves which the other considers aggression and therefore resists. (It takes two sides to make a war.) States readily rationalize aggression as defense by arguing that it forestalls a real or fancied enemy. The record is pretty straight (generally documentary), as to which nations have started wars during the last 75 years. In that period the same states have repeatedly been aggressors. Likewise, the same resisting states have fought more than once, rather than to permit changes in their power position relative to that of the attackers.

Small nations are unlikely to start a fight with large ones, because they do not have the armies, the production capacity, or the size to take on such an unequal match. They therefore adopt other policies in order to maintain their national sovereignty. The chief among these policies, which vary with the state and with the times, are as follows:

(1) A small state may consistently try to remain neutral, *i.e.*, to stay in balance between powerful nations, especially those nearby. This is possible if its utility to neighbors or other interested powers makes neutrality more valuable to them than conquest. The classic case is Switzerland, always safe so long as each of its surrounding strong neighbors is concerned in preventing any other Great Power from dominating the lucrative trade routes across the central Alps. When France dominated all the surrounding states under Napoleon, Switzerland lost its independence for a time. After the Italo-German alliance and the fall of France in 1940, it was in grave danger from the German authority by which it was entirely surrounded. The liberation of France has improved its position as a neutral.

(2) A small state may tie itself into an alliance with a Great Power, and depend upon it for protection against interests opposed to that power. Belgium was thus guaranteed by France and Britain against German aggression after 1919. In 1934 it cast off protection in favor of neutrality. Henceforth it depended upon its location near the vulnerable southeastern corner of England and the heavy manufacturing district of northeastern France and northwestern Germany to get protection from one or more of these Great Powers against any aggression by any neighbor.

(3) A small state may proceed with little regard for large states, even to the extent of risking war with neighbors of its own size. Thus, the nations of southeastern Europe have consistently played politics with each other. At times they have allied themselves individually to this or that Great Power—to Russia, to Austria-Hungary (subsequently to Germany), to France, to Great Britain. Again, they have entered into wars with each other, as in 1912, 1913, and 1921. Bolivia and Paraguay, fighting over the Chaco in the 1930's, present another example. The geography which makes such a reckless policy possible is remoteness from the really acute interests of Great Powers, coupled with meagerly developed natural resources.

While small states do not pick quarrels with large nations, they frequently act as the means to wars involving Great Powers. Their own conflicts, although small in scale, are likely to jeopardize the interests of some powerful state and so invite interference by its armed forces. Even when not fighting, a small state may seem to a large nation a menace, a temptation, a nuisance, or a barrier. If the condition becomes sufficiently galling, the Great Power may attack the little sovereignty unless held in check by threat of force matching its own, *i. e.*, by some other power or alliance of powers.

The last 80 years have witnessed several instances of a large state attacking a far less powerful nation. From these attacks some evidence may be forthcoming as to the symptoms of war in the modern age.

An aggressor state aims to gain additional territory. It is likely to give its geographic ambition a geographic excuse. It may rest its claim upon location, declaring itself to be hemmed in by potential enemies. Or upon natural resources, claiming that it is a "have not" nation. The procedure is to select a victim, usually an adjacent country, which is likely to be smaller, or at any rate, weaker than the aggressor. Before launching an attack, not only the prospective combatants but also the prospective neutrals are divided in such a way that no preponderance will join in defense of the victim. Ideally, all third parties will be so aligned as to prevent each other from entering the war.

The wars that have had most serious consequences for the world were planned long before they were begun. Illustrations may be drawn from both Europe and Asia.

The series fought in Central Europe in 1864, 1866, and 1870 were prearranged as a unit. In 1864 Prussia (recently enlarged) picked on a small country, Denmark, at a moment when neither Britain nor France was willing to support the chosen victim against the aggressor. The territory torn from vanquished Denmark was allotted to control by Prussia and Austria jointly. After two years, Prussia used a dispute over that bit of territory as an excuse to attack Austria, by this time weaker in the military sphere than Prussia. Success gave to Prussia sole control of the bone of contention and also annexation of German neighbors who had supported Austria in the war. After 4 more years, the enlarged Prussian State was sufficiently integrated to precipitate a war against France, generally considered a stronger power. France was forced to make over to its conqueror Alsace and much of Lorraine. This series of wars, fought with the most advanced military techniques by the Prussian generals, was the progressive product of unified political strategy devised by the Prussian chancellor.

The successive acts of aggression by which Japan has lifted itself to the point of challenging the whole world are less closely knit, but bear unmistakable earmarks of long-term planning. The early chapters are war against China, 1894-95; against Russia, 1904-05; and the "Fifteen Points" to which China acceded without fighting in 1915. On each occasion territorial concessions were wrested from the victims, states much larger than Japan, but militarily weaker.

Beginning with overt aggression in Manchuria in 1931, there has unfolded a pattern of military advances calculated to bring under Japanese control the mainland of East Asia and the Pacific islands. A plan for attacking Pearl Harbor may not have been worked out as early as 1931, but well before 1941 the aggression was prepared, to be launched without delay at the first propitious moment.

So much for symptoms manifested by the chief aggressors in the

last 80 years of warfare. There are also symptoms common to the forces that have repeatedly resisted aggression. The resisters do not propose to lose their territory or trade. They are likely to be protectors of the integrity of small states, either by proclamation in advance or by necessity, born of the war, to shield their own territory. Resisters make no plans for offensive war, or for peace measures to prevent future wars. Their defenses are usually inadequate. Often they go so far as to announce that they do not propose to participate in wars between foreign states. It is significant to note that the world lays plans for wars, but not for peace.

In turning from observation of symptoms to essay a diagnosis of the war disease in the contemporary world, certain facts appear. For nearly a century, the same states have been the aggressors, while others have been the resisters. In certain pertinent ways, conditions affecting these two groups differ.

The aggressors acquired their present boundaries relatively late. They have fashioned their state structure anew, to conform to their enlarged territory, population, and resources. They have come into the heritage of industrialism recently, by joining the ranks of the nations using coal, iron, and other natural resources in the factory system of large-scale production. Their form of government is absolutism, and authoritarian supervision extends to cultural, as well as political life. In their educational system propaganda is substituted for factual information. They have a tradition of territorial expansion by military force, maintained as a cherished ideal by the entire public. The ambition begins with conquest of neighbors by armies, but it grows to include expansion overseas, as well as on land contiguous to the home country.

The traits in common among resisters are not so uniform. They possess long-established boundaries. Beyond these frontiers they have not recently been aggressive. They hold much territory, either contiguous or overseas, perhaps vastly larger than the coreland which serves as a home base. A considerable fraction of these holdings consists of lands only slightly or partially developed in the sense of technological and economic exploitation of their natural resources. The resisters handle much of the world's foreign trade, and wish to keep it. The civilian population has lost any strongly militaristic tradition it formerly may have had. Their governments make treaties and alliances which they respect in good faith. Their armies are kept as small as their exposure to attack permits, and the units are not as carefully trained or as fully equipped as the armies of militaristic, aggressive states.

This diagnosis leads to the immediate conclusion that the equilibrium of the world's political power is very easily upset by aggressive, well-armed peoples whose governments think they can gain

more than they will lose by attacking ill-prepared states. The diagnosis is incomplete if it assumes that wars are solely the result of willful but irrational ambition. There is a never-ceasing current of change, powerful enough to shift the balance between established states, regardless of state policy. These underlying progressions take the forms of change in material technology and in modes of directing society. At some periods such shifts are more numerous and disturbing than at others. In the last few generations they have reached farther and deeper than in any other preceding epoch. As these shifts inexorably take place, they awaken in some nations a desire to overturn the existing political status, while other countries fear any radical alteration.

Technological improvements have resulted almost wholly from science and invention. Nearly always they take shape in novel ways of utilizing the natural environment. Social and political devices facilitate or hamper man's use of his habitat, according as they restrict, permit, or encourage the best use of the environment within the limits of the technology of any given epoch.

When devices for managing society keep pace with technological changes, there is little incentive to violent political overturn. It so happens that political, social, and even economic forms usually lag behind material technology. A nation may not be ready to alter the status of a colonial territory as fast as that area advances in its use of natural resources. It may then attempt to suppress technological improvements that threaten to shift the internal balance of population or wealth. It almost certainly refuses to permit foreign countries to develop resources, even though it may be using them unwisely or not at all.

Because of unprecedented technological changes, the twentieth century found the world out of step with itself. In the business cycle, the distance between peaks and troughs has increased, while governments have found no suitable means of avoiding the sad condition of "famine in the midst of plenty." In other words, economic society has not kept pace with the technological progress flowing from the Industrial Revolution. At best it is a nineteenth century model, decades behind the times.

The existing political pattern of the earth is even farther from being up-to-date. It was worked out during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Most of the nations that took form in that epoch have been completely outmoded by both their technological and economic structures. With a few lucky exceptions they are small, having developed in the day when horses and sails furnished the most effective means of locomotion, and when hand farming and hand crafts set the tempo of production. The size of most existing states was set by the productivity of these simple methods of labor

and the distances conveniently negotiable by these slow means of transportation. Acute disharmony has arisen between the political pattern inherited from the early modern age, and the technological and economic patterns of the twentieth century. Although the statement is oversimplified, the geographic diagnosis of contemporary wars comes down to a recognition of the lag between technological changes in using the earth and the political adaptation to these changes.

Remedies for the war disease are being proffered on every side. To the geographer none of them promises a cure unless it can bring the earth's political structure into tune with the technological requirements and economic instruments of contemporary life.

Because technology may be defined as the mode of utilizing natural resources, the distribution of utilized resources with reference to political units must be reasonably accordant, if peace is to be insured.

The distribution of mineral wealth among the nations is highly arbitrary. Most of the important deposits of industrial minerals were found long after the existing political pattern took form; hence their quantity and value may throw the national economy out of line. A nation like Italy, wont to thrive on rich soil, may find itself poor in essential minerals, while a little country like Belgium turns out to be heavily endowed. But no nation possesses all the minerals needed today. Even the wealthy United States is deficient in about a dozen minerals required for waging war. Neither has any nation all the different minerals it needs for peacetime living.

Some products of the soil are likewise discordantly distributed. Not a single manufacturing country feeds its people, unless by drawing on overseas or contiguous empires. At the same time some agricultural countries produce heavy surpluses. Likewise, but for different reasons, forests are not equitably divided among the nations. The huge acreage needed for present-day effective utilization survives only where field crops do not thrive and population is sparse; therefore, states that have the largest percentage of forest land are likely to be politically weak, because of their small populations.

Far-seeing persons are already proclaiming the necessity for all nations to have access to nature's storehouse in ratio to their needs. That the goal is desirable is generally agreed, but before it can be achieved, political rivalries must be abandoned or compromised.

In the past something has been accomplished by bilateral treaties, covering specified commodities. At best, the results are piecemeal; at worst, threat of force governs such agreements. The procedure has not ensured peace in the past, nor do current attempts promise better. Petroleum is one of the world's most valuable mineral resources, and essential to all forms of motor transportation, vital in both peace and war. The British and United States governments

have recently been drawing up agreements for concurrent use of certain potential oil fields. Evidence is accumulating that it will be hard to satisfy either country. Control by British interests of the rich oil deposits of Iran has been challenged by the Soviet government, which already has the largest potential oil supply on earth.

An alternative procedure for unified utilization of politically segregated natural resources is the cartel. Cartels have been frowned upon in the United States, yet they repeatedly reappear after each rebuff. They provide a solution for the economic problem of distribution by dividing the earth into sales regions, and giving exclusive rights to specified producers. They provide a solution for the technological problem of bringing together scattered commodities, by exchanging items critical in the manufacturing process. Thus technical and economic teammates are effectively utilized, no matter how widely scattered their places of origin and destination. The most obvious case of cartels is the varied and complex steel industry, utilizing coal, iron, and alloy metals, and serving a world market. Cartels have not brought peace, partly because some governments have used them as instruments for making war, while others have failed to regulate them, and sometimes have failed to recognize them.

If enduring peace is contingent upon harmonious use of scattered natural resources, it is no less dependent upon the size of states. The size of a nation limits its population. Natural environment is not everywhere uniform, but the size of the state goes far to determine manpower and wealth of the nation. The law of chance gives a large state a better prospect for a variety of natural resources than a small state. The rule is not hard and fast, but it serves as a crude measure. An approach to self-sufficiency exists in a few of the larger states; certainly not in any of the smaller ones. (Incidentally, only a single world state can ever become fully self-sufficient.) Future technological progress favors the large state because unexploited resources are found mainly in unpopulated borderlands and colonies of such states.

Size is a military asset of great value, which has been so amply demonstrated in the last 4 years that mention of it suffices. France did not have size enough to avoid conquest. Russia did have size enough to permit invasion, and ultimately to eject the intruding armies and wreck the enemy's military machine. Large size is an asset to navies, as well as an asset to armies. The weakness of the British naval hold on the Mediterranean Sea in the early period of the war lay in the small size of British possessions on its shores. In military terms, the British holdings had insufficient depth. Large size is a marked asset in air warfare. One of the sharpest issues of the peacetime to come is the question of air rights in respect to the sovereignty of states. With the issue of "freedom of the air," the

world once again faces the sort of problem that "freedom of the seas" presented in the centuries when naval supremacy was in the making.

The conference, held in Chicago late in 1944, on use of the air for transport, seems to a geographer a most critical fork in the road to enduring peace or resumption of war. The largest political unit on earth, the Soviet Union, took no part in the conference and thereby withdraws from international flying, while withholding from other nations the right to pass over Russian territory. The United States, a large state but without widely distributed air bases in other parts of the earth, stood for unrestricted use of the air, including the right to land to discharge and pick up traffic. The British and French, representing large and scattered empires, favored control of air transport by an international commission, which presumably would restrict traffic in foreign countries. Size and distribution of territory are basic elements in the three divergent views of proper air navigation.

Only the large states can hope to be capital powers. These include well-integrated empires, especially the British Commonwealth of Nations. Mere size, however, is not enough; the natural environment must also sustain a large population. The three powers of the next years are conceded to be Russia, Britain and the United States. Possibly China and France will be two others, because both control large territory and have large populations.

In the past Germany and Japan have been powerful states. Although they have never had large homelands or extensive empires, both are moderately well endowed with minerals. These nations achieved their power position by making maximum use of the area they controlled. So long as some states utilize their space more effectively than others, they will be able to wield incommensurate power.

Besides resources and size, location figures large in the prospect for peace. Striking power in war and reach in peacetime pursuits are unequal between states that are alike in everything except location. Norway and South Chile are examples showing how the single critical fact of location may result in contrasting character and vicissitudes. Norway with its many harbors is a very different state from inland Switzerland. Holland, at the mouth of the Rhine, is unlike Sweden, not far away but offside all main trade routes. The British Empire is scattered all over the earth and faces all the oceans. It is a very different kind of state from Soviet Russia, cut off from the sea and all in a single block.

The location of a nation is a clue to its character and a mainspring of its policy. Enduring peace must take account of the directives of national life that spring from the *genius loci*.

Effective remedies for the war disease are to be found only where political policy touches environmental conditions. The air is full of

suggestions for bringing postwar political society into line with economic and technological patterns already stamped on the world. The prospect for success of any such suggestion is limited at the outset by the probability of its adoption by existing governments. Once adopted, it will succeed only to the degree that it is able to subdue political intransigence to practical requirements of current technology.

Some of the proposals for guaranteeing peace involve sweeping reconstruction. One such is "Union Now." This slogan does not demand world-wide unification. Rather, it urges immediate political union of enough states to create a block of power which no opposing alliance would ever dare challenge to combat. If it can be achieved, such a union promises to be effective. It would involve an enormous and immediate alteration in the political structure of the world. Another proposal is for the sort of world union that takes its cue from the United States Federal Government. It would have the superstate based, not upon the nations participating in the federation, but directly upon the individuals making up their population. That would require alteration in the world's political order, even more profound than "Union Now."

Less doctrinaire, and therefore more possible of fulfillment than either of the foregoing, is an international organization of winners in the present war. The most official of such projects is the scheme outlined in 1944 at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Such a plan in modified form is the most likely instrument to be adopted.

Of special interest to the geographer are proposals for regional groupings of the political world. The intent is to provide for a political line-up that will include the fewest possible tension zones. One of these confines the regrouping to colonial holdings. It would take advantage of agreements for unified regional dealings already in existence, and extend them to other areas. Another proposes grouping the nations so as to make the most of their respective locations, and consequent joint interests.

Finally, there is the possibility of reverting to laissez-faire in the political realm, leaving future wars to chance. This is stoutly rejected as yet, and will presumably be the course followed only if all efforts at cooperation fail.

Every proposal to ensure peace undertakes to set up and operate political machinery necessary for implementing peace. Some propose ultra radical political reforms, requiring basic changes in every participating government. But whether radical or not in the political sphere, they fail to reach down to the underlying conditions laid down by nature—the foundation on which a lasting peace must rest. Agreement on such matters as rules for air transport, allotment of natural resources, and release of tensions between near neighbors,

seem to the geographer prerequisites to the functioning of any sort of machinery for maintaining peace.

Permanent peace or even long-lasting peace is not to be had without a reasonably accurate assessment of the critical aspects of the wealth of the nations, using that term broadly to include their natural resources, their size, and their location. The capacity of the people of each political unit to utilize effectively its nature-given wealth also has to be taken into account. This is only partly a matter of geography. National psychology directs and enforces national achievement, always within limits prescribed by nature. Once these stubborn national attitudes and these unchanging natural conditions are recognized, the world will be in a position to devise a peace that can utilize economic and political machinery in such a way as to give the world earth-wide opportunities to progress.

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF EFFECTIVE WORLD ORGANIZATION

by

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The subject assigned to me to discuss this evening is not an easy one. Since I was first requested to appear tonight, however, there have been certain developments which, while not simplifying the problem a great deal, have given us some encouragement to hope that progress is being made on the problem of political organization for peace. I would say that the conditions now existing are much more favorable to possible effective action than they were after the last war. To say that in another way, I think the will to peace, the desire for permanent peace, is more widespread and that more people, especially in the powerful countries, are more impressed with the necessity for peace than in the last war. Of course, we still have the two-thirds rule, which, as in the last war, could be a great obstacle to the adoption of a far-reaching peace treaty on our part.

One commonly accepted idea is that an organization to preserve peace is created, and that is all there is to it. Americans especially are liable to this idea because we have the feeling that our own Constitution is a divine instrument which burst forth in full bloom after it had been given a very short consideration, and that then and there all our problems were solved. That is an erroneous idea, and I hope that whatever organization evolves from this war will not be based on a very rigid instrument, or that the people of the world will regard it as a final solution. The making of peace and the creation of a political organization is a continuing process which must go on as long as we are a Nation. An organization or a constitution that gives the appearance of being sufficient would give us a false sense of security, and we would not pursue the establishment of a peaceful world with the vigor we should. We should remember that keeping the peace will be a continuing process and that actually the details of the machinery, while necessary, are a small part, and the most important contribution we can make will be our best brains and the continuing will and desire to make the organization effective. That is what has happened here in the United States. Our Constitution, by interpretation, uses, and in other ways, is changing tremendously, although the problem that confronted us at the time of its adoption was not so great as is the present problem of reconciling the differences of all nations.

Peace is going to come in one of two ways: Either by the use

of force or by agreement. We should not forget that it is up to us either to proceed to create some machinery through which we can collaborate, through which we can continuously negotiate with the other nations in order to achieve collective security, or to recognize that some nation—it might be Russia, China, or a combination of nations—will inevitably create and force upon the world some system designed to keep peace. The present war is the result of the Nazis' effort to do that. Wars have become so destructive to all the positive values of our Christian civilization that people will not continue to endure senseless destruction of their lives and property. Peace and order will come in one way or the other. Of course, this Nation and our Allies believe it should not come after the German fashion, but through agreement. We can and have reached agreements during the war, but the great danger is in continuing our efforts through the period of peace. Whether we succeed will depend upon us—and the citizens of the other peace-loving countries—who must demand that our government continue to recognize the interdependence of nations, as well as people. That is the only significance of the action of Congress last year in passing resolutions favoring world organization. I was the author of the first resolution, and I am frank to admit that it did not solve anything. It did, I believe, lead us away from the idea that we could live in isolation from the rest of the world. The real job of organizing the peace is now to begin.

Dumbarton Oaks is, I believe, the first step in the creation of machinery to maintain the peace. It is an essential step but it is not the most important thing that should be done. In case you are not familiar with the broad outline of this proposal, it is a fairly simple instrument. The plan provides for a General Assembly of which the peace-loving nations will be members and have a single vote. Then, there is provided the Security Council, which is really the Council with power, consisting of 11 members, 5 of whom are the big nations—United States, Russia, Great Britain, China and, in due course, France—and the other 6 are to be small nations elected by the Assembly. The small nations will alternate in those seats; that is, the 6 seats will be passed about among the small nations by election. The real power to enforce peace is in the Security Council. The plan also calls for a court, a secretariat, and some subsidiary organizations contemplated for social and economic purposes. These, of course, are important, and I think they are essential; but our attention, from the political and military angle, is centered upon the Security Council. The real problem, of course, is the question of how to create an agency that will control the forces of aggression.

There is one phrase in the instrument which disturbs me more than any other single thing. That is the first principle which, it says, is based upon the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states. The

word "sovereignty" has been much abused. I don't think it means what some persons insist it means in many instances. To say that the main and first principle of this organization is based upon sovereignty seems to me to be a narrow view. To me it is ridiculous to say that Guatemala and Santo Domingo are going to have the same voice and independence of action as the United States or Russia. We must have regard for the small nations. I think they should be treated properly, but we are faced with the terrific problem of trying to reconcile the interests of these large nations. If we become so concerned over this idea of sovereign equality, difficulties are raised in the way of agreement by the major powers. There are the two extremes—the isolationists who want to do nothing and the federalists who want to adopt immediately a complete Federation of the World, similar to the strong Federal Union here in the United States. I think in theory it is difficult to answer the argument of the federalist, but I don't think as a practical matter we can attain a complete federation at this time. That is a goal toward which we may aspire within 50 to 100 years, but I don't think we can get that far in one step. On the other hand, the idea of sovereign equality (which means that each nation is absolutely free to do as it pleases, if the word has any meaning at all) is absolutely incompatible with the idea of an organization with power to keep the peace. I think it is misleading to put that principle in the charter. What is sovereignty worth to a country like Belgium, France, or Poland? I wonder how much pleasure or satisfaction the starving Poles in Warsaw today derive from the idea that they were a sovereign nation. Looking at realities, I doubt that the people of the smaller nations, leaving out for the moment small vocal groups, have any great attachment to the idea of complete sovereignty. A further point is our own experience with the principle of sovereignty. We, if any country, are sovereign in controlling our own destiny. Yet, though we were intent upon staying out of the war, and though we took all possible steps to keep out of the war, we are now in it. In spite of our sovereignty and our power, we were still brought into this war. In other words, our sovereignty, our control over our affairs, was defective to the extent that we were forced into a war we did not choose to enter. And they talk about sacrificing our sovereignty! It is true that an international organization will have some control over our destiny, but we will participate in and influence the direction of that control. Further, if such an organization prevents the recurrence of wars, we actually will have acquired a greater control over our own affairs. For a simple example, take this business transaction: If you buy a house worth \$10,000 and give \$5,000 for it, you have according to the argument, sacrificed \$5,000. Another way to look at it is that you gained \$5,000—the difference between the price and the value of the house. That is exactly the

way I consider sovereignty in connection with an organization which will control these violent and aggressive forces, which we alone cannot control.

Many of us are susceptible to the erroneous thought that because we are a powerful nation we can go our own way. Surely, even those who say we should keep a large navy and army and stand off the world know that would be utterly impossible if the world chose to combine against us. I see no hope in that direction. The only hope is, I think, in a Security Organization, but I don't like the idea of trying to preserve the individual freedom of action of every nation in the world. It was all right 50 or 100 years ago, but circumstances have changed now to make obsolete the political organization of the world. I don't profess to know exactly all the things that should be done. But we must have an attitude of adaptability and I don't think we should regard the idea of sovereignty as something sacred and absolutely inviolate.

With further reference to the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement, there has been much talk about voting procedures in the Security Council. Newspapers have stated that Russia is insisting upon a veto power on any subject that involves coercion of her own nation. This very troublesome problem comes up in every proposed international organization—whether it be on education, economics, or, particularly, politics. The real basis for this objection on the part of Russia, I would say, is her suspicion and fear of the attitude of the western countries, just as we are fearful of her. It is vitally important that we, particularly the powerful nations, overcome this lack of confidence in the motives of one another. Until the organization is tried and proves its worth, I have the feeling that the major powers are going to insist upon the principle of agreement; that is, that all must agree—especially the three big nations—or no action will be taken. It seems to me that in the initial stages there is some justification for this attitude. As a matter of fact, if the "Big Three" don't agree and are not determined to make this organization work, it is not going to work, no matter how beautiful the machinery nor how perfect the details of the constitution. In addition, if there is the feeling that all the members of the Security Council must agree, they can continue to negotiate and compromise until they do reach a basis of agreement. Some of the war agencies have operated on somewhat the same basis. In our combined boards with Britain and Canada, I understand that decisions are not forced, but that the members simply keep on negotiating or discussing the problem until they do reach a basis of agreement.

In any case, I do not feel that we should insist upon the details of voting as being so vital in its importance at this stage in the development of the organization. The main and vital point is to have

an organization that will bring countries together for consultation on their problems. In that consultation we will have to trust to our own good sense, the rightness of our cause, and the power of persuasion. We have not yet reached the stage where the votes of the international organization can be visualized as the voting of a chamber of commerce or a fraternity. In the latter, the members are usually willing to accept the decision. Such an attitude may be developed later, but I doubt whether it will be true in the beginning.

You, of course, have read that subsidiary organizations are contemplated, and already we have had some example of how they are proceeding. The Bretton Woods Conference is one example; the conference on aviation in Chicago is another. If the results seem disappointing, we should recognize that they are the first feeble efforts. At least these conferences brought nations together, and the very act of bringing them together tends to destroy that suspicion which they have of one another. The willingness of most countries to gather for a discussion of these problems is in itself quite encouraging. Those organizations will be tied into the political organization. The assembly has the power, I think, to study, to make recommendations, and to bring these groups into the political organization.

The educational organization which was discussed at the Conference of the Allied Ministers of Education in London and which we recommended to the State Department last spring set up an international education office, which would play an important part in this organization. Especially, would it play an important part in breaking down suspicion among various nations and developing among them a conception of where their own interests actually are. Of course, that is a great problem, for both individuals and nations, to realize exactly what course of action is for their best interest. It is the short-sightedness of most nations that leads to their trouble. That problem is particularly very difficult with regard to Russia. I cannot help but believe that, if ever she realizes we have no designs on her, the Russians have enough sense to recognize where their own best interests lie. Surely the example of this war, of the futility of Hitler's policy, will not be lost altogether upon the Russians or any other peoples.

There is one other feature of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference which seems to me of considerable interest and which may be developed. That is the reference to regional organization. The Charter does not set up regional organizations, but simply states that the adoption of this organization in no way should hinder regional organization. In a sense, it contemplates the creation later on of regional organizations. Some very well known planners have attempted to view this whole problem of political organization on a regional basis. Some have made efforts to outline regions which form a complete economic

unit or a self-sufficient economy, and I think there may well be some merit in that idea. I think if we can create an over-all organization, with force and a court of justice, we will have made a very important step; and the further creation of regional organizations with reference to economic conditions may add much to the stability of this political organization.

It seems to me that the idea of regional organization would be in conflict with the idea of sovereign equality. I think this hemisphere, as an example, would be a very excellent regional group within which there could be established all sorts of economic cooperation. Then, by working out our problems on a mutually satisfactory basis, we would achieve much greater political stability. There is no end to the varying ideas as to where these regions might be. Russia presents a very clear-cut one; then there might be an Asiatic one, which would probably include India and China; a European one, including the Mediterranean basin; and a very troublesome one in Africa. These proposals are much too long to go into in detail, but they have been drawn up by writers in various ways, which I think would tend to lessen the points of friction. Opponents argue that by creating much bigger units, one is creating much bigger wars. I do not see how it would cause much worse wars. The point is, there would be a lessening of friction, so we won't have any more wars. That is the only goal worth trying for; and it seems to me there is merit in the idea of the regional organizations, which would create a much more stable economic order and would contribute to the stability of the political organization.

The Chairman asked if I would stop a little early in order to allow time for questions. I would conclude by saying that I have the feeling as I said in the beginning, that our chances for peace are better than at any time in history. I believe that the decisive result in the last election is not the least of the contributing factors. Wherever given a choice, the American people rejected isolationism and chose participation backed by force. Not only is the result very persuasive on the representatives in Congress, but I think it exceedingly beneficial from the point of view of the Russian and British attitude. I think it has given them, and will give them, confidence that this time we are going to make every effort to go through with participation. I think nothing more powerful could have happened to influence the attitude of those countries. Regardless of what the President or the Secretary of State might say, our Allies still might well have believed until the election, that perhaps our people would not support our stated policy. Further, this country is in a more powerful position now than in the last war. Our army, navy, and air forces are the greatest in the world. If we have enough brains, we should have influence to direct the world along the lines that are

agreeable to our ideas of a proper civilization. That, I believe, is a system which recognizes the freedom of the individual, as opposed to the system that existed in Germany.

The greatest question in my mind is whether or not this country, and the others, are going to be able to provide the men with brains, talent, and intelligence to represent us in these organizations. Our weakness has been the attitude of the people generally toward their government. During the last 100 years, our attitude toward government has been that it is an irritating necessity. It never occurred to my best students that they should become politicians or should enter public service. They were always attracted by the high salaries and great prestige of our industrialists. We must realize that mediocre men cannot make an international organization effective. It is going to take very forceful and bold men—men who are able to recognize the new forces in the world and to see the necessity for making new decisions and commitments, which we would not have made before. That to me is the greatest danger of all. A combination of varying circumstances justifies the creation of the organization, justifies our entrance and that of the other nations into it, even though both we and they may be selfish. But it is a question of getting those men, the very ablest and most honorable which we can produce, to represent us and to see to it that the international organization works.

I appreciate very much this opportunity to discuss with you these problems. To me they are the fundamental problems. We often get excited about reconversion, unemployment, and other domestic problems. However, I firmly believe we cannot make any progress over a period of time in the solution of these domestic problems unless we can create some confidence in a peaceful world. We will be upset, not only in wartime, but in time of peace too, if the people of this country and the world have no confidence that we will prevent another great war. If we must prepare for war, what is that going to mean in the way of governmental control, regimentation, and many problems of employment we think we are going to solve as soon as this war is over? Many seem to think this subject is academic, is of no concern to them, and is something for the diplomats to solve. I don't think it is going to be done by professional diplomats. The people must insist that something new be done, and must not accept the same old phrases that we have so often accepted in the past.

Questions

Question: I would like to ask Mr. Fulbright if he doesn't think the nations going into this international organization keeping in mind their sovereignty is pretty much like a fellow getting married. He goes into it with the idea of retaining all his sovereign rights, but the chances are against his being successful. But if he is interested

in giving up a few things in favor of greater good for more people. . . ?

Mr. Fulbright: There is something in that, too. In all these things there is sometimes a little misapprehension; and if that little phrase, "Come on in," will help, maybe it is justified on that grounds. But if we take the principle of sovereignty literally the way it is written, I think it is a bad thing. I would be afraid to comment on that analogy of marriage. The thing I don't like about such rigid principles is the later effect when things don't work out in accord with it, say, in 5 years. We are going to be in a position, I am afraid, where some little nation—Andorra, or some other—is going to come to this Council and say: "The great United States guaranteed our sovereignty—what are you going to do about it?" They will say we are heartless people and don't live up to our promises. It puts us in an awkward position to make any such statements, I think. Actual necessity of circumstances might force us in time to get away from the idea that every little nation must have sovereign equality. In this country we still talk about the "Sovereign States of Arkansas and Minnesota." We still kid ourselves that they are sovereign. The two-thirds rule was one of the things designed to try to preserve the sovereignty, and look how ridiculous that has been. Any change in status quo regarding our foreign relations now is in the control of 34 Senators, which, in effect, gives a minority the controlling voice in our foreign affairs. Nevada, with 1 Congressman and 2 Senators, has the same sovereign equality as New York, with 45 Congressmen and 2 Senators. There is no justification for it.

Question: Would you care to say anything about the powers of American delegates. . . . ?

Mr. Fulbright: You mean the question whether or not we should have power to permit us to use force—the one question discussed in the election? Of course, both sides finally agreed that the delegate should have the power. I don't see any alternative. That is a matter, you might say, of administrative action. In the first place, our delegate to this conference, and all conferences, will be authorized by act of Congress. I mean all his powers are granted in the first instance. I understood the whole controversy was whether or not we are in favor of having Congress authorize our delegate to vote or have the power to permit the use of our force in some controversy. You see, the Security Council is going to have the power, according to Dumbarton Oaks, to take action if some nation is doing something that indicates that it is preparing for war. Now, shall the Security Council and our member on the Council say, "Yes, send our air force against them," or must he come back to Congress and ask, "Shall I send them or shall I vote?" I think it makes an impossible situation and, so far as being effective in operation, it can't work, it is too cumbersome. The main thing we have to create is the conviction that this force is

going to be used. If that conviction is ever created, there isn't going to be any aggression. The decisive reason Hitler attacked was that he was convinced that we were not going to come in, at least not until it was too late. We passed a law guaranteeing to him that we would stay neutral. I suppose he thinks we are double-crossers for repealing that law; and maybe, on a strict moral basis, he is right. If you can create the conviction that force is going to be used to stop aggression, that is the main thing we want. The reason there is not much law-breaking is that most of us are convinced if we do break the law we will get caught. Now if you slow it up, and leave doubt as to our use of force, I think you would destroy the principle of the organization. We will have to have confidence in our delegate.

Question: In this series we have heard about the danger of our getting involved with Russia. I feel there is more than just a Red scare. You indicated you thought we might be able to get along very well with Russia, yet a lot of people have said there is a balance of power—just one great power in Europe and that will be Russia. I wonder if you would tell us more about whether you thought we could have both Russia and the United States sincerely trying to get along if there was a real conflict, or could we expect to get along?

Mr. Fulbright: I think we can. I don't see any great danger of not getting along. I am assuming, of course, that Russia has no designs on conquering the world; and after all, since 1793, the last partition of Poland, when three nations participated, we see she has not been very aggressive. We might say she has been a defensive nation. Russia does not seem to have ideas of expanding through aggressive action, of dominating the world, or that she believes she is the dominating race. Russia is one of the most tolerant of all nations of the minority races within her own country and has not evidenced any of those things. And from a material point of view, she is more than three times as large as we are, has more population (I think it was estimated to be 180 or 190 million before the war). It seems to me that her energies could well be used at home. I can't see where her interests or ours conflict. There is always some conflict as long as there is competition. In this country, the interests in New York and Massachusetts have conflicted with Arkansas and Mississippi; that is, people thought they did, because people were short-sighted. I believe they were wrong in not permitting industry in the South and in opposing revision of freight rates. Over a long period, I think they will prosper; that by having a prosperous South, all will be better off. Even though some individuals in a State will lose a factory, others will move in and more than offset the loss. The same thing is true with Russia. There may be conflict in the sense of competition, but in viewing our relations as a whole,

I don't think so. Among other nations conflicts can be much more acute. But we are not planning to create an organization that will do away with conflicts—the point is to prevent those that will grow into wars, to seek a solution of those conflicts. I don't think the nature of the conflict between Russia and this country is such that it would ever break out into war. You have heard people continually talk about the Communists. I think in the last election they voted about 42,000. As for their ideology overcoming ours, I have a feeling that the only reason some of the people have that fear is that they believe the communistic idea is going to overcome ours in the long run, because that system is better. I don't think it is better. I think if we have a period of peace and these countries get to know each other, our job will be to make them see that ours is the best, to make them want it, and they will. In fact, we have already demonstrated up to this point our ability to do more for our people—our organization of society has produced better results than any other. If we can maintain that standard, the problem will be solved. We can't do that sort of thing by passing laws or saying mean things about other nations.

Question: What agreement was made at Dumbarton Oaks for working out problems in the economic world? If we could take the same force and, as time goes on, try to ameliorate and work out the problems of individual nations, it would be quite a help.

Mr. Fulbright: I agree with you. As I said a while ago, it is of great importance to have men of intelligence. I think one great danger in this thing would be for peace enforcement to fall into the hands of people who want to preserve the status quo. That will be merely building up material for a much greater explosion. I think the agreement must be a means for adapting to changing conditions. Now the machinery, as I understand it, does not prevent that. You see the assembly can recommend the economic and social organizations for the studying of these readjustments and problems. Now, such questions as the Colonial question—I mean of all colonies of such countries as the Netherlands, particularly, and of Belgium and of Great Britain—those are very troublesome problems. Certainly, I don't think this organization should be used to freeze that present set-up at all. I can't believe that is a legitimate purpose. I sometimes feel these problems can be worked out on an independent basis within these regional organizations. The independence of small dominions, which are not self-sufficient and can't protect themselves, are just a source of friction, because they look as if they are fair game for anybody. Java is very rich, any country might want it—how are you going to dispose of it? It can't protect itself. It is like a very rich young lady—liable to attack from any source. Now, that is the type of thing I mean. For the present I don't think independence in such

cases will do, but should be integrated into some system. I must confess, as I did at the beginning, I don't know all the answers as to how organization should be done. It should be subject to continuing revision, and this organization should work these things out. It should not be rigid; and if we adopt it as the final solution, we should not go off and forget about it. World organization is something we should be concerned about every day. That is vague, but I have not yet seen anybody who could draw up a perfect blueprint of machinery that would run itself, regardless of the type of men who operated it.

OLD AND NEW DIPLOMACY

by

ANDRE GERAUD

French Journalist and Editor; Author of "The Gravediggers of France"

I am going to take up a very unpopular cause, the cause of old diplomacy against new diplomacy. Listening to the indictment of new diplomacy, you will perhaps agree—this is my hope—that not without reason does the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement for World Security, which was published a few days ago, evince the spirit of old diplomacy rather than that of the new. And when I speak of old diplomacy, I use the word in a rather special sense, in reference to the effort made between 1904 and 1914 by British and French statesmen to ward off war with Germany. I am old enough to have seen both old and new diplomacy at work. Both of them have failed. Old diplomacy did not prevent the World War I from breaking out in 1914, and new diplomacy did not fare any better in 1939. But the peacemakers who tried their hand at the task in the thirties failed more conspicuously than their predecessors. Faults of omissions have to be laid to the door of old diplomacy; they hardly bear comparison with the faults of commission for which new diplomacy stands guilty.

On the strength of the history of the last 34 or 35 years, my purpose is to demonstrate that to curb would-be disturbers of the peace, and to carry out any positive action in the international field, definite political and military commitments must be entered into. Such commitments lose their point if diluted into general pacts to which 20, 30, or 40 governments subscribe. Multilateral pacts, of all necessity, cannot be related to concrete situations. In them only general principles can be embodied. It means that when impending danger is to be faced, endless deliberation goes on. It is the old story of the town council, which keeps the firemen waiting at the very moment when prompt action is required. Even assuming that a decision has been arrived at, all measures of execution are more likely than not to prove extremely disappointing if dozens of states are involved. In a convoy which gropes its way across the Atlantic Ocean it is the slowest ship that sets the pace. Similarly, in any large association of states called upon to carry out the obligations binding upon them, those who are ready to go ahead and face risks are held back by others less determined to act and prone to entertain reservations, if not to play a double game. The definite military and political commitments I have mentioned cannot be expected to operate quickly and efficiently, unless a few great powers, closely linked together, are ready to wage war on a pre-concerted plan. To secure that result a continuous adjust-

ment of national interests must take place between them. Let them get apart from each other under the pressure of conflicting interests: Surely, they will not be ready to take up the challenge when the aggressor, or would-be aggressor, shows his face. If too many associates are brought in together, such adjustments are difficult to bring about. This, of course, does not imply that great powers are at liberty to trample on the rights of the weak, nor that secondary powers must be left in the cold, but it connotes that a distinction must be made between equality of rights and equality of functions, and that the leadership must rest with the great powers. Let us look back to the lessons the last three or four decades have had to teach.

In this country still lingers a belief that the 1912-14 "Triple Entente," in other terms, the alliance of France, England, and Russia, which fought the First World War against Germany, came in for a fair share of responsibility in the origin of the First World War. It has been explained in many volumes, published on the morrow of the Peace of Versailles that, after all, French, British, and Russian diplomacy had given Germany good cause to fear that she was being caught in a circle of iron and, to vindicate her freedom and independence, had better unsheathe her sword. So long as the treaties of the Triple Alliance, which bound together the Central Powers—Germany, Austria and Italy—had not been published, learned professors, cut off from their contact with international affairs, might perhaps grant Germany the benefit of the doubt. But, around 1920, the treaties of Triple Alliance were made public by an Austrian professor. Then it was for all to judge—for all except fools—that from the beginning of the century Germany and her subservient ally, Austria-Hungary, had grown to be a terrible danger to our civilization.

If the Hohenzollern emperor had only been a little more patient, if he had postponed the attack to, let us say, 1920, and if the German fleet, which gave such a good account of itself at the Battle of Jutland, had had another 5 or 6 years to complete its preparations, I don't know what would have been the outcome of the attempt made by the Central Empires to conquer the continent. It is to the honor of my country that a French minister was the first to detect the coming peril.

In that book to which your chairman referred a few minutes ago, it was my painful duty to censure the politicians who, from 1925 to 1939, led France to the abyss. In contrast, French statesmanship, at the turn of the century made itself conspicuous for its foresight and its steadiness of purpose. You perhaps keep in mind the names of two or three great Frenchmen, as the symbols of what was best in my country: Clemenceau, Foch, and Briand. Posterity, I believe, is likely to drop the name of Briand into oblivion and to keep in great reverence the memory of Theophile Delcassé, who was French foreign

minister from 1898 to 1905. That man, on taking charge of French diplomacy, immediately reached the conclusion that to keep Pan-Germanism under restraint and to safeguard civilization, was to bring about an alliance of France, England, and Russia. This was nothing less than a paradox 47 years ago. It had always been assumed that Russia was in Europe a disturbing factor, and that Austria-Hungary deserved to be called a great conservative force. It was Delcassé who, more than anyone else, realized that Russia had ceased to be a menace to Europe, and that, contrariwise, Austria-Hungary, in the process of absorption to which it had been subjected by Germany since 1867, had been turned into a hotbed of aggressive elements. Delcassé insisted that for the defense of continental peace the time had come to associate England and Russia. In that respect it can be said, without exaggeration, that the coalition set up by Delcassé between 1898 and 1907 (August 31, 1907 is the date when the Anglo-Russian Entente materialized) must be seen retrospectively as the initial pattern of the international system which was first put into shape at Dumbarton Oaks.

The Triple Entente, as brought into being by Delcassé, was realistically planned. It failed because there was too little of a true alliance in it. That deficiency is accounted for by the British diplomatic tradition, which still thrived at that time; it took another 20 years and the test of the Second World War for that tradition to disappear. Our British friends were too far removed from political realities. They were still imbued with the optimism of the Victorian Age. In compliance with French entreaties, they agreed to set up a mechanism of military cooperation. They never definitely committed themselves. They still believed in the concept of the balance of power. That concept was very different when professed by a Frenchman from what an Englishman understood it to be. To a Frenchman it meant that, when France was not able, by her own resources, to keep in check a nation that threatened to dominate the continent, the only safe course to follow was to seek an increment of material force through the conclusion of an alliance with one or several States. In all cases, France, of course, was the center of the coalition. With all her resources she entered the fight. To an Englishman, deft use of seapower was enough to uphold a continental equilibrium. Owing to her sacrosanct Navy, England was in position to keep the scales even by using only a minimum contribution of her own substance. For such a clever and comparatively inexpensive game to succeed, there were two prerequisites: First, a faultless calculation by the British Foreign Office of every nation's resources; and second, the ability of British diplomacy to swiftly shift support from one group of states to another. In 1914 England was at fault on those two counts.

It has been my privilege to know personally most of the British ministers of 1914. Already, Winston Churchill had sprung into prominence. I don't believe that a more brilliant group of statesmen have ever sat, at No. 10, Downing Street, around the council table: Herbert Asquith, Edward Grey, B. Haldane, David Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, and others, truly were the elite of Edwardian England. With all that, they lived in an imaginary world and far too slowly came to rightly appreciate the seriousness of the international crisis with which they had to contend. In 1914 British and German societies were closely intermingled. A dear friend of mine, then a girl in her teens, had been sent to Germany to learn the language. At a reception given by her mother, one of the great ladies of the time, she addressed a colonel of the guard with the following words: "How can you take your work so seriously? You know as well as I do that there won't be any war. Why do you waste your days training soldiers?" This is merely to give you an idea of the atmosphere which then obtained in England. The Triple Entente did not prevail because our British friends refused to see the world as it was. And, mind you, that same friend of mine did not greatly change her attitude after the First World War. Once she said to a German foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann: "Why do you grieve about Germany's defeat? Military victory is a mere delusion." The same policy of appeasement which we have seen in full swing in the late 30's was tried by the London cabinet during the period 1909 to 1914. The London cabinet had to face the emergence of a strong German navy. Clearly, the Pan-Germanist movement was gaining momentum all along the Danube. The economic enslavement of Turkey was described in diplomatic reports. Yet, our friends, for the sake of soothing the Hohenzollern emperor, hardly hesitate to deliver to him Asiatic Turkey and to partition the Portuguese colonies. There is no need to explain further why the Triple Entente failed to check Germany. The Triple Entente has been accused of secrecy, of all sorts of shady machinations. That indictment can be ascribed only to German propaganda and crass ignorance. The great diplomats of the period, Paul Cambon, Camille Barrere, Sir Charles Nicholson, and Harding, either were my friends or I lived very near them. They were much more candid and more honorable than the diplomats I have met in the last two decades. I should call them models of frankness, as compared with some of their successors.

President Wilson complained, when America entered the war in the spring of 1917, that he had never heard of the treaties that had been negotiated in 1915 to win Italy to our side and to compensate Russia for her sacrifices in the war. Really, Woodrow Wilson must have had at his disposal a very indifferent foreign service. There was no real secrecy about those agreements with Rome and St. Petersburg.

Incidentally I shall remark that today American and British diplomacy, under the stress of war, grope approximately along the same path.

Now it is my turn to accuse, to explain where new diplomacy has failed. Here is the crushing charge. Germany, in 1930, set itself to prepare for war. She practically started with very little, from a clean slate. A modicum of common sense and courage would have been enough to bring the Nazis to the ground. That the war of 1939 should have broken out at all is really a scandal which casts condemnation on all the men who wielded governmental influence. The dead hand of "new diplomacy" was on them.

"New diplomacy" came on the scene when the "Covenant" of the League of Nations, the opening part of the treaty of Versailles, was put in force and the Geneva establishment was set up. Anyone who took the trouble to follow, session after session, the discussions in the council and in the assembly of the League can hardly have felt surprised at the catastrophe that came to pass 20 years later. We had better look first at the man who took charge of the great undertaking. The Secretary General of the League was an official from the Foreign Office, Sir Eric Drummond, who was to end his career as British Ambassador to Rome. I wish that his correspondence with the London Foreign Office might some day be unburied and duly published. Then, it will be for all to appreciate the calibre of his intelligence and of his character. Sir Eric Drummond's deputy, quite a young man, had been a commercial traveler. He had practically no experience in international affairs. Lord Robert Cecil had urged Clemenceau to appoint him. "Since I do not care a brass for the League of Nations," the French Premier told his friends afterwards, "I have conceded Lord Cecil's request. What does it matter?" Clemenceau was wrong. It did matter. The League of Nations was out to destroy French policy, as traditionally conceived. What a medley of strange people crowded on Geneva! The idea upon which these zealots for eternal peace based their belief was that, in the modern world, material interests are bound to tell on the masses much more powerfully than old-fashioned nationalism. They did not doubt that a tremendous volume of public opinion would turn against all governments that dared resist international law and Geneva tenets. They were sure that the Germans had been transformed into peace-loving liberals. The little girl whom I mentioned a few moments ago had become the wife of a foreign diplomat. Early in 1938—the noble experiment then drew near to its close—she seriously asked me whether a second world war could possibly break out, after all. She still thought that armies and fleets would not be seriously put to use. The lady was behind the time.

But her words expressed, at any rate, the Geneva atmosphere before 1933.

The first achievement of the League was to destroy the French-British alliance, which has been the main instrument of victory. Why should the alliance have survived? The League's Covenant was to reign supreme and undisputed. I wonder whether you have any notion of what that Covenant of Geneva meant. You probably suppose that, at any rate, it excluded war in all forms; that, on paper at least, all acts of aggression were held punishable. You are mistaken. The Covenant, even in theory, did not rule out all recourse to arms. In its gaps through which war could work its way were left wide open. If there was a conflict, the Covenant provided for sanctions to be unleashed by the Council; but, since unanimity was required and, under article 16 the aggressor was allowed to vote, it was up to the aggressor to impede the procedure. Under article 15, which dealt with the settlement of conflict before any act of violence had taken place, the interested parties, it is true, had no voice in the decision of the Council, an improvement on article 16. But, listen to this paragraph in article 15, "If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report."

I wish you would keep this in mind. It is crystal clear. A government is in dispute with an aggressive government. It feels that an attack is impending. It appeals to the Council. If the Council rules unanimously in its favor, the only obligation to which the members of the Council are committed is to remain neutral if war breaks out. But, if the Council fails to reach a unanimous vote, the members of the League are entitled to take such action as they will consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice. In other words, if the members of the Council disagree, it is open for anyone to do what he likes, to side at will with the aggressor or with the victim of the aggression. Sanctions are only to be enforced if the warmaker, before jumping on his neighbors, has not complied with the long-drawn-out procedure before the Council, or with the alternative method left to his choice, arbitration, if he has begun waging war regardless of the 3 months' delay after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council.

I have laid stress on those prescriptions in the Covenant because they make you realize that the Covenant did not do away with war, that there were all sorts of breaches through which war could lawfully work its way. For several years French statesmen tried hard to plug those breaches. All sorts of additional treaties were considered and

negotiated. The so-called "Protocol" of 1924, the general act for the settlement of conflicts succeeded each other. They did not prove more satisfactory than the Covenant. As a matter of fact, in later years, neither Japan nor Italy nor Germany, the aggressors who came forward, took the trouble to maneuver and make use of the gaps in the Covenant for waging a lawful war. They boldly sent their troops on the march in the conviction that the economic sanctions at the disposal of the Council with no compulsory military sanctions to back them could hardly achieve their goal, and they were right.

A word must be said now about the treaties of Locarno, which were intended to prop up the Geneva fabric from the outside. They were signed on October 16, 1925, by Briand, Austen Chamberlain, and Stresemann. They deserve to be regarded as the most deceptive and dishonest diplomatic instrument ever conceived. If you want to form an opinion on those treaties, all you need to do is to read Article 4 in the treaty of mutual guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy, the so-called Rhineland Pact, and Article 1 in the arbitration treaties between Germany and Poland, and Germany and Czechoslovakia, which were simultaneously brought into being. In them new diplomacy is to be seen at its worst. According to Article 4 in the Rhineland Pact, England and Italy offered to come forward to the help of France in case of a flagrant violation by Germany of the Versailles Treaty on the demilitarization of the Rhineland. It reads as follows:

In case of a flagrant violation of Article 2 of the present treaty, or of a flagrant breach of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles by one of the high contracting parties, each of the other contracting parties hereby undertakes immediately to come to the help of the party against whom such a violation or breach has been directed, as soon as the said power has been able to satisfy itself that this violation constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression, and that by reason either of the crossing of the frontier or of the outbreak of hostilities, or of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarized zone, immediate action is necessary.

Wonderful! At last we have come across a definite pledge devoid of all ambiguity. But the story does not end there. How could new diplomacy have put up with such a clarity of purpose! The following addition was made:

Nevertheless, the Council of the League of Nations, which will be seized of the question in accordance with the first paragraph of this article, will issue its finding, and the High Contracting Parties undertake to act in accordance with the recommendations of the Council provided that they are concurred in by all the members other than the representatives of the parties which have engaged in hostilities.

Now we are in the dark. According to Article 4, England and Italy, the guarantors, are under the obligation to immediately come to the help of France in case of a flagrant violation by Germany of the Treaty of Versailles on the demilitarization of the Rhineland—imme-

diately. They are not supposed to waste time in deliberation. Yet we are told that they must also conform to the finding of the League's Council: What a sad contradiction! You know the result. In March 1936 the German troops invaded the Rhineland. England did not act, England the guarantor, and it was out of question that Italy, the other guarantor, should move. The League's Council met in London, and after 2 days it reached the conclusion that it had no business to make any finding, because the Locarno treaties had been concluded by the third powers independently of the League. By the way, Council and Assembly had for 10 years bestowed their blessing upon "Locarno." The matter was left there.

No less mendacious were the arbitration treaties between Czechoslovakia and Germany and between Poland and Germany. In Article 1 of both it is stated: "These treaties do not apply to disputes arising out of events prior to the treaty and belonging to the past." On that ground, territorial disputes did not fall within the scope of the treaties. Really, I don't believe that, in all the records of history, it will be possible to find a match for such a tricky form of words. There we shall find, of course, numberless examples of brutal aggression, but I must confess I prefer naked cynicism to veiled hypocrisy. We were safer, after all, before 1919. No wonder that the mendacious system failed in 1939. Once again, the Triple Entente, the product of old diplomacy, failed in its purpose because it was paralyzed by an out-of-date British policy and did not vigorously enough organize defense. Nevertheless, the Triple Entente did not falter. But for the medieval structure of Russia it might have won, even without American help. In contrast, when new diplomacy was put to the test around 1935-36 there was a stampede toward the former mode of international security, which had been deliberately destroyed 15 years before. In all haste, we French tried again to renew the old association with England, according to the ancient style. We found that our British friends had sunk once more into the illusion of the balance of power. New diplomacy had let that illusion survive. A British ambassador, Lord Lothian, had won the confidence of the American people. He was the main prophet of the balance of power in 1935. Addressing the House of Lords in March 1935, he boasted that the repudiation by Hitler of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles a few days before, and the reassertion of full German sovereignty over the Rhineland, was a healthy change and made for a better equilibrium in Europe. Lothian was deeply imbued with the spirit of new diplomacy.

I have mentioned, when dealing with old diplomacy, the charge of secrecy which was brought against it. I should like in a few words to call your attention to the expedition of diplomatic business under the new regime. New diplomacy will be remembered for the fact that

heads of governments became the chief protagonists in all international negotiations and ambassadors were reduced to the condition of mere ushers, or even sank to the level of a mail box. Undoubtedly, in wartime, it is natural that the heads of governments should take all diplomatic business in hand. But, in wartime, heads of governments, more often than not, are men who have been tried in the international field and have proved their mettle. Contrariwise, in peacetime, in the natural course of things, the ministers in charge have won promotion in the electoral and parliamentary field. Careers of that pattern are not what is required to make real statesmen.

It will be argued that, in the years between the two world wars, second-rate ambassadors were, on the whole, appointed by the British Foreign Office and the Quai D'Orsay. But they were second rate because the politicians did not want to have, in the main diplomatic posts, men strong enough to interfere with their own complacency. I can tell you this. The diplomatic correspondence of the French and British ambassadors published after the last war bears witness to their foresight, at any rate, in most cases. Particularly, as regards France, the archives issued in book form on the origins of the wars of 1870 and of 1914 redound to the credit of the majority of French diplomats. Whether the diplomatic correspondence of the period 1920-39 will ever be divulged is doubtful. Nobody could be proud of it.

So much for the indictment of new diplomacy. Now the way is clear for a summing up. The protective system erected in 1914, the Triple Entente, was still in an embryonic state when the Central Empires resolved to force their hegemony on the Continent. Fully grown alliances were needed then, and that necessary condition might not have been a sufficient condition. It was the stagnation of British political thought which largely accounted for the persistence of a rudimentary organism. With all that, the Triple Entente of 1914 did not give way under the German onslaught and was soon in full battle array. But for the blind policy followed toward Turkey and for the medieval structure of Russian society, it might have stood the test, even without the full participation of American military power. The Triple Entente, notwithstanding its faults, was cast in the mold of political realism. It rested upon the convergence of French, British, and Russian interests. The statesmen who put it into shape had assimilated all the lessons of history, and were full of contempt for ideologies. Their business was not to resettle the world, but to solve its problems for the next 25 or 30 years. They trusted their successors would proceed with the same work, and meet new circumstances in the same spirit.

They considered all panaceas as positively dangerous, because

these were more likely than not to rule out the solutions required for the immediate future.

The international system built up in 1920, the "new diplomacy," broke down the first time it was tried, in 1935. Neither in 1936, when the Germans invaded the Rhineland, nor in 1938, when the Czechoslovakian problems was thrown upon Europe, was it thought worth while to bring the international system of 1919 into play. It fell into desuetude and nobody was sorry for it. Instinctively, all conformed to the tenets of old diplomacy. But to reinstate the old alliances, in the nick of time, the services of exceptional statesmen were required. In 1934 Louis Barthou had a chance to succeed. You know that he was assassinated and Pierre Laval took office. We have no right to bank on the services of an exceptional man to redeem a long series of errors. At the most we are entitled to hope that slaves and fools will not, in an emergency, assert themselves, because the best possible conceivable international system can be wrecked by them. The Dumbarton proposals of world security do not come within the range of this lecture. However, it may be permissible to say that they bear the imprint of the cruel lessons inflicted upon us in the last 30 years, and concede surprisingly little to the claims and practices of new diplomacy. New diplomacy had disarmament in the forefront. At Dumbarton Oaks the emphasis was laid on the political and military alliance of the great powers. According to the conceptions which became fashionable around 1919, the world was to be ruled on universal principles. Today, a grand alliance, centered on the enforcement of the eventual armistices with Germany, Japan, and their satellites, comes into its own. This grand alliance, if it keeps together, will have its feet firmly planted on the ground. Unlike the 14 points of Woodrow Wilson, the Atlantic Charter is not intended to be applied as a rigid pattern. In the words of Winston Churchill, "it is a guidance." It has the value of a geometrical limit. The national interests of the great powers are being submitted to a continued process of mutual adaptation which, however painful and difficult, is needed to make their solidarity a lasting one. All this is likely to sound very modest and commonplace in contrast with the clamorous ideology of 24 years ago. But aren't we compelled to admit that only a well-defined system, geared to a concrete purpose and comparatively limited in scope, can take a firm grip on international realities?

I don't want to end on a note that you will deem pessimistic or disheartening. I feel confident that this world of ours will not be denied the sort of stabilization which was the privilege of the civilized man under the Roman Caesars in the first three centuries. The new diplomacy has been dissected and found wanting, but it isn't to be inferred that we shall be confined, of all necessity, to the narrow

circle of possibilities within which old diplomacy moved before 1914. Whether and when the reign of international law will make the world secure, cannot be predicted; however, it is reasonable to stand by these two assertions: (1) Assuming that the grand alliance of Dumbarton Oaks stands the test of one generation, then definite progress toward an international system built on more ambitious lines may well materialize. Let us in imagination rewrite the history of 1919-39. Let us figure out the course of events if the 1914 alliance had not been scrapped after the first world war. Then, Germany's revengeful preparations would have broken on that rock in 1930-40, if they had been attempted at all. Then, the tide of the time would surely have favored far-reaching schemes of world organization. The Covenant of 1919 could not be a point of departure; it could not be lived up to. To some degree it might have been a point of arrival. (2) In the intervening period, it will devolve upon public opinion to provide some of the checks and balances without which the selfish interests of the great powers might oppress the weak. To scorn such checks and balances is only too easy. They cannot be relied on to work at every turn, nor even perhaps in most occasions. Nevertheless, it is fairly safe to lay down as a general rule that no grand alliance of the Dumbarton Oaks model is likely to survive if confronted with a rising volume of criticism in the principal democracies of the world. Against the eventual excesses of the system, this safeguard, therefore, cannot be called inexistent.

THE DUMBARTON OAKS PROPOSALS IN THE LIGHT OF LEAGUE EXPERIENCE

by

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One of the most suggestive ways in which to study the Proposals for future international organization prepared at the recent meetings at Dumbarton Oaks—called officially the Washington Conversations on International Organization—should lie in an examination of those proposals in the light of the experience of the League of Nations. Other methods of approach are also available, of course, but the comparison mentioned should have many useful lessons to teach.

Two assumptions are made in launching upon this discussion. One is that the world of nations, and the United States as unavoidably a part of that world, needs more extensive and more effective political organization than it has possessed hitherto, although the question of just how much international organization we need, and also the question of just what kind of international organization would be best, are open to much discussion. The second is that the League of Nations constituted a considerable mixture of good and bad, of strong points and weak ones, if judged by the first standard, and failed for a variety of reasons, not just one. All these aspects of the matter will determine our conclusions in the end.

The first thing that strikes one, as he takes up the results of the Dumbarton Oaks meeting is, of course, the tentative character of these Proposals. They are officially so labeled, and this aspect of the matter has been repeatedly emphasized by both the President and the Secretary of State. The Proposals are drafted in terms of what "should be" done except for four paragraphs of "Principles," where the term "shall" is used.¹ They consist of recommendations, not even of draft agreements, with the possible exception of the four paragraphs mentioned.

Several comments seem called for by the very decision to give to the results of the Dumbarton meetings the character of tentative proposals and to publish them in that form. It might be argued that any comparison between the Dumbarton Proposals and the League system must be somewhat unfair, because it involves a comparison between frankly tentative suggestions, on the one hand, and, on the other, a system which boasted a formally drafted and ratified constitution and

¹ *Proposals*, Ch. 2. See also Ch. 6, sec. C, and Ch. 12, Note.

had also enjoyed 20 years of intensive development in practice. The comparison is inevitably provoked by various features of the situation, however, and supporters of the new Proposals have made much of their superiority over the League system². These advocates have also emphasized the care with which the Proposals were drafted, and we shall proceed with our study without further hesitation, making due allowance for the discrepancy mentioned, but avoiding any temptation to merely damn or glorify one or the other system.

The procedure of publishing the Proposals in tentative form has, in the first place, much to commend it. Launching the League Covenant as a complete draft agreement on February 14, 1919, undoubtedly had the effect of provoking criticism and opposition on one side, and of crystallizing loyalty on the other, beyond what the merits of the various provisions justified. Both tactically—from the point of view of the promoters of the program—and in terms of constructive statesmanship, the technique of the sponsors of the Dumbarton Proposals seems most commendable. It is sound scientifically and “liberal” in the best sense of that much abused word; in the erroneous but growing use of another popular term, it is very “democratic.”

On the other hand, such a procedure leaves room for some disingenuity and, even if completely sincere, can be carried too far. The Covenant of the League was, it may be recalled, opened to criticism by the small powers in Paris, in the course of its preparation, and the draft Covenant was submitted to criticism by world opinion later, but its framers were not too cordial to suggestions for change. It is to be hoped that greater liberality will be manifested this time.

And to whom are these Proposals made? To “the four governments which were represented at the Washington conversations,” said Mr. Hull. But it was the “representatives” of these governments who drew up the Proposals on their behalf, in, we are told, “complete cooperation,” so that, in effect, these governments are now merely studying their own unanimous recommendations! To the “peace-loving nations of the world,” it is said in another place, and finally to “the peoples of all countries”; evidently the matter is left somewhat ambiguous.

Finally, the consideration of the Proposals was to lead to a formal United Nations conference, which will draft a charter for submission to the governments for their adoption (presumably after further public consideration), not to mention certain supplementary agreements on the security problem which are vital for completion of the system. It is evident that the situation is not without its dangers of delay as well as confusion.

² Green, J. F., *The Dumbarton Oaks Conversations*, *State Dept. Bul.*, 11 (278): 459, 465. 1944.

The second major point to be noted is that chief emphasis is placed in the Proposals upon the maintenance of peace and security as the object of the new organization but that serious attention is also given to economic and social welfare both in the beginning (briefly) and in the latter part of the Proposals.³ This mode of treatment runs parallel on the action taken on these points in connection with the League. International cooperation was indeed named ahead of peace and security in the statement of League objectives in the preamble to the Covenant. In the first decade of League history, moreover, such activity was developed far more than work for peace and security; and peace and security occupied less than half of the space in the Covenant, whereas this relationship is reversed in the Proposals. So far the Proposals and the Covenant would seem to diverge. Preservation of peace was undoubtedly uppermost in the minds of the framers of the Covenant, however, and the development of the nonpolitical activities of the League in its first decade took place more or less without great enthusiasm on the part of the governments. And finally, although the problem of peace and security is given far more extensive and drastic treatment in the Proposals than in 1919, economic and social aspects of international life are at the same time given far more thorough consideration than they were at that time.⁴ The net result is a repetition of the course of action followed under the League with, in addition, a notable stepping up of both organization and procedure in both branches. It may be conjectured also that the experience of the first decade of the new organization will, if it comes into being, be very likely to duplicate the first decade of the League, as described above.

As a matter of fact, we may well pause at this point to note that all through the Proposals, in matters of structure and in matters of procedure, in general principles and in detailed provisions, even at certain points in sheer phraseology, there emerge many repetitions of League of Nations features and League experience.⁵ Indeed, at certain points—the composition of the Council and Assembly, and the strictly diplomatic character of the latter, for example—the resemblance is unfortunately too close. This was inevitable, it is quite normal, and definitely better than frivolous disrespect for previous experience in organized international cooperation, of which there was altogether too much at Paris in 1919. The similarities between the two systems are even,

³ *Proposals*, Chs. 1, 8, and 9.

⁴ Although the treatment given these matters in the Proposals is less advanced than that accorded to them in much League practice and in various recent international commodity agreements: *International Commodity Control Agreements*, International Labor Office, Montreal, 1943.

⁵ Compare *Covenant*, art. VI, Par. 1, with *Proposals*, Ch. X, par. 1, and *Covenant*, art. XXI, with *Proposals*, Ch. VIII, sec. C, Par. 1.

or should be, quite a commonplace if also a somewhat amusing comment on the hysterical hesitations of some politicians on the subject of the League, even at this late date. It is to be hoped that neither League friends nor foes will try to exploit this aspect of the situation so as to impede the development of the new organization.

One other preliminary consideration arises at the very beginning of the text of the Proposals and again at the very end. In the first paragraph of the document it is indicated that the new organization is to bear the title, "The United Nations"; in the very last paragraph reference is made to "enemy states."⁶ It will, however, be recalled that one ground on which the League was criticized, not only by persons in sympathy with the Central Powers, in 1919, and even as late as 1939, but also by persons in Allied countries and neutrals, lay in its being more or less identified with the victors in the war, their interests, their policies, and their demands. The organization now planned is, according to the present Proposals, to be identified with the victors in this war to an even more pronounced degree, thus offending not only ex-enemies but genuine neutrals as well, not a very important practical consideration, perhaps, but a moral weakness at least. Now there seems to be little truth in the view that fruitful political organization, national or international, must always, especially in the beginning, be based entirely on free consent; the history of state-building does not sustain such a conclusion, although indicating at the same time that the greater the amount of free consent at the bottom of any organization the easier will be its task. What it does sustain, however—and League experience confirms the general lesson—is the inference that if certain states are to be compelled to submit to authority of one kind or another the states in charge of the organization must stay on the job and carry it through, which is exactly what they failed to do in the case of the League. The organization by coercion must also be converted into organization by consent, as in our own federal union today, as soon as such a development is feasible.

A similar problem arises over treatment of nonmember states. In the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals a very drastic provision is encountered, aimed at compelling such states to abide by the principles of the organization as far as may be necessary for the maintenance of peace and security, while not going so far as to compel universal membership in the Organization.⁷ League experience and common sense both compel the comment that the successful operation of such a provision, not to mention its peaceful operation, will depend on the absence of any strong outside state disposed to challenge this system. This is

⁶ Preamble, and Ch. 12, par. 2.

⁷ Ch. 2, par. 6 (2).

apart from the ethical or juridical propriety of such a provision, which is debatable though probably susceptible of justification.

The foregoing problems lead directly to the question of the treatment of ex-Axis states in regard to membership. The test of membership in the Organization is to be love of peace, according to the Proposals.⁸ Inasmuch as it must be very difficult to devise objective standards for measuring such an attitude, the judgments passed on particular cases may and even must be very subjective, or highly "political" in character. Introduction of this test tends to render the Dumbarton Oaks program less liberal and more reactionary than the League Covenant, which imposed no such test, though action in this matter under the terms of the Proposals might not be any more unintelligent and ungenerous than the behavior of the League members in respect to membership for Weimar Germany in the years 1919-26.

It is interesting to note that no provisions are suggested for specific guarantees by states becoming members of the new Organization, such as were included in the Covenant, and no provisions for withdrawal. As no benefits were obtained from the provision for guarantees in the Covenant, and as any scrutiny of applicant states beyond the "political" scrutiny of existing members was made by an Assembly committee, this omission is probably not important practically, although it seems rather slovenly on the surface. The denial of any right of secession will be regarded as progressive or reactionary according to the answers which the student gives to other questions. but it is certainly very radical.

And are the ex-Axis states, particularly Germany and Japan, to be judged to be peace-loving right after the war? Probably not, even if new and "democratic" governments have been established there. The result may be a repetition of the unfortunate experience of the League in this respect, intensified by the more drastic character of the provision regarding nonmembers, as compared with Article XVII of the Covenant. It would seem that the only safe and promising solution would be to require membership in the Organization as a term in the peace settlements with the defeated powers, as should have been done in 1919. No great aid in operating the Organization could probably be expected as a result, even with the hoped-for changes of governments and attitudes in those countries; but no real damage could be done by them either, and they would be present where they could be continuously controlled, and all the problems raised by either their desire to enter, or their refusal to enter, later on might be avoided.

The emphasis bestowed in so many words upon the principles of sovereignty and equality in the Dumbarton Proposals⁹ is also greater

⁸ Ch. 3.

⁹ Ch. 2 (1). Neither principle is mentioned in the Covenant.

than is the case in the League Covenant and to this extent those Proposals again seem more backward than the earlier document. That these references were deemed necessary, in order to harmonize with earlier declarations and Congressional resolutions and to quiet political opponents, does not alter their basic character. Of course, the real problem is that of how much respect is paid to these archaic ideas in practice, and many international unions, not to mention various national federal unions likewise—the United States included—have found it possible to achieve considerable effectiveness while professing the doctrines in question. On the other hand, it is just so much more difficult to attain to salutary modifications of these dogmas in practice in proportion as they are verbally stressed in constitutions and rules. It is also to be noted that the provisions for the structure and operation of the new Organization (no withdrawal, amendment procedure, powers of Council and Assembly)¹⁰ run counter to these ideas even more flagrantly than do the provisions of the League Covenant, and the contradiction involved herein also seems to contain serious elements of danger.

Not much needs to be said further on the main outline of the proposed Organization—Assembly, Council, Court, and Secretariat—although the Council is given a rather special character, as will appear in a moment, and a special name. As stated in general terms, the structure is identical with that of the League, omitting the International Labor Organization. The treatment of the Court, as in the Covenant, is a treatment by cross-reference;¹¹ we are told that the Court of the new organization should be based in one degree or another on the existing Permanent Court of International Justice or its statute, but nothing more can be said on the matter at this stage. Nothing is said concerning regional or other extensions of the jurisdiction of the present Court or its structure. Finally, although provision is made for a new Economic and Social Council, and great emphasis placed on this new development, as already mentioned, that organ is apparently to be maintained on a distinctly lower level than the principal organs of the new system, and subordinate directly to the Assembly.¹²

With respect to the Assembly, as outlined in the Proposals, still more serious problems arise. In general, the organ is maintained on the level of a debating and supervising body, like the League Assembly, rather than being elevated to the status of a legislative body. The self-contradictory and undemocratic diplomatic principle of equal representation is maintained, a bad following of League precedent.

¹⁰ Ch. 8, sec. A, par. 3, and sec. B, par. 3; Ch. 11.

¹¹ Ch. 7.

¹² Ch. 9, sec. A, par. 1.

It is, moreover, by the terms of the Proposals, to be subordinated to the Security Council much further than the League Assembly was subordinated to the League Council, and this not merely in the matter of security, but also in regard to other matters such as the admission, suspension, and expulsion of members, even in the choice of the Secretary-General and in still other matters.¹³ On the other hand, the Assembly is to be given the power to "approve the budgets (*sic*) of the Organization," to elect a majority of the members of the Security Council, and to act in even the most important matters "by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting," unanimity never being required.¹⁴ The conjecture may be hazarded that the same development is very likely to be experienced here as occurred in the League, namely, great increase of influence on the part of the Assembly, until the Council came to be regarded as subordinate, in general, thereto. The suggested—strongly suggested—provision that the Assembly should not make recommendations in security matters when the case is being dealt with by the Security Council¹⁵ would, even if adopted, be of doubtful effectiveness. Finally, if the framers of the Proposals did not see fit to follow the drastic provision of the Covenant which placed the Great Powers in a majority on the League Council,¹⁶ but felt compelled to follow¹⁷ the more liberal pattern introduced when that body was increased to ten members and the Great Powers thereon placed in a minority of two, and to give the Assembly the first place in the general pattern,¹⁸ how can they have hoped that the Security Council would remain superior to the Assembly in general prestige?

In many ways, however, this Security Council forms the central feature of the system proposed at Dumbarton Oaks. It is to discharge the main functions of the Organization, the maintenance of peace and security, dealt with in the longest chapter in the Proposals. Its composition has already been noted. It is to have a Military Staff Committee, including possible regional subcommittees.¹⁹ States not represented on the Council and even states not members of the Organization are to be invited to "participate in the discussion" of matters and disputes, respectively, affecting them.²⁰ The Council is to function continuously through representatives permanently stationed at the headquarters of the Organization; it is to meet periodically and may meet elsewhere than at headquarters.²¹ The Council

¹³ Ch. 5, sec. B, pars. 2-4.

¹⁴ Ch. 5, sec. B, pars. 4-5, and sec. C, par. 2.

¹⁵ Ch. 5, sec. B, par. 1.

¹⁶ *Covenant*, art. IV.

¹⁷ *Proposals*, Ch. 6, sec. A.

¹⁸ Ch. 4 (1a); Ch. 5.

¹⁹ Ch. 6, sec. D, par. 2.

²⁰ Ch. 6, sec. D, par. 4.

²¹ Ch. 6, sec. D, par. 1.

is to operate only by the processes of inquiry and recommendation for the settlement of international difficulties and disputes, although recourse to judicial decision is suggested and extensive powers are given to prevent or suppress violence or aggression when such consequences result from failure of the voluntary settlement projected.²² In case of need, the Council is to use military force to be placed at its disposal by member states for that purpose.²³ Regional arrangements for the same course of action are to be permitted, subject to supervision and control by the Council of the central Organization.

By comparison with the provisions of the Covenant dealing with the same problems the stipulations of the Dumbarton Proposals are at times much more promising, at times less so—always assuming that the Organization should do whatever is possible at reasonable sacrifice to maintain peace and order, even by the use of military force if need be. Thus the provision for a Military Staff Committee and forces immediately available for direct use by the Council would constitute steps in advance—again on the assumption mentioned above. So would the continuous availability of the Security Council, although the League Council also had just about reached this point. The provision of regional agencies might be useful if they were properly coordinated. Other provisions are normal and some are identical with elements in the League Covenant.

On the other hand, the concentration of attention on “peace and security” and the disregard of the merits of the dispute or the details of procedure for its settlement which, in general, characterize the paragraphs of this chapter in comparison with analogous articles of the Covenant, will be regarded by some as a great weakness. International law and justice are not given much emphasis in the Proposals as a whole; it seems that, whatever we may think of the hostility to the law and lawyers and the skepticism as to judicial procedure which prevailed among the framers of the Covenant in 1919, the drafters of the current Proposals have gone even further in getting away from such things. They have avoided most if not all of the provisions of Articles X-XVI of the Covenant, with their more or less definite stipulations and steps in procedure. The result is certainly to leave to the Security Council far more discretion than the League Council or Assembly enjoyed under the Covenant, and to give to the Court of Justice still less of a possible share in the operation of the security system it had—which was little enough in all conscience—under the League Covenant.

Such a situation will be regarded by others as an improvement. Attention is concentrated on keeping the peace, leaving settlement of the dispute and vindication of the rights of the parties for later.

²² Ch. 8.

²³ Ch. 8, sec. B, par. 4.

Action for the purpose of preventing aggression is not to be allowed to get tangled up in all kinds of technical details of law and procedure. The Assembly is to be kept out of the picture and it is doubtless hoped that the Great Powers, who must bear the chief responsibility in this matter, as we are so often reminded, and who certainly wield preponderant power in the circumstances, will lead, if not dominate, the Council.

Unquestionably the League sanctions system cried out for improvement in the direction of simplicity and effectiveness. The question is whether in trying to achieve this result the drafters of the Proposals have not committed other errors just as serious, in another direction, as those inhering in that system. For the arrangements contemplated do not assure or even aim at either the principle of Article X or that of Article XIX of the Covenant, neither at respect for existing rights nor revision in the interests of justice, except insofar as any effective prevention of "aggression" must tend to confirm existing rights and any "recommendations" for dealing with a dispute or dangerous situation might tend to mitigate existing maladjustments.

It is only fair to say that final judgment on these points is impossible as yet, in view of the tentative character of the Proposals and the absence of certain vital elements still in process of negotiation, such as voting procedure in the Security Council, the organization of the International Court of Justice, and (to quote) "several other" questions. Without going so far as to say that this makes any consideration of the Proposals idle or useless today, it does compel us to await definite texts before drawing conclusions, particularly in these crucial matters.

Thus, in connection with procedure for enforcing security, the extent to which the states are willing to place at the disposal of the Council military forces by which it can take police action—*not* "make war"—without consulting them before doing so, will make a great deal of difference, to put it mildly. Whether disputes can be carried before the Council, in case that body hesitates to act on its own initiative, by one of the parties—Proposals say "they should obligate themselves to refer it (a dispute)"²⁴—would, as League experience showed, also make a great deal of difference. Who is to decide whether disputes arise, in the words of the Proposals, "out of matters which, by international law, are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned" and therefore removed from security procedure?²⁵ These are, indeed, questions of detail, but League experience showed that the treatment given to such "details" had enormous effect for good or bad on the action sought in such situations.

²⁴ Ch. 8, sec. A, par. 4. The reference in par. 2 is obviously inconclusive.

²⁵ Ch. 8, sec. A, par. 7.

So for the arrangement finally adopted concerning the vote of a state party to a dispute in case the Security Council considers action against that state; or, for that matter, the whole question of unanimity in the Council in any case of threatened aggression.²⁶ There is some temptation to say that in such cases the outcome will not be controlled by who votes or how they vote, whether it be a Great Power which is involved or a weak state. If the latter is involved, action will be taken anyway, if considered necessary, it is said, and even in the former case this might also be true. In any case the situation will be so terribly dangerous that we should be likely to have war anyhow, and what happens is not going to turn on voting or any other kind of procedural technicality.

Such an attitude—which, incidentally, seems to be reflected somewhat in the very paragraphs of the Proposals under consideration—seems to be unduly cynical, very dangerous, and scientifically and historically inaccurate. The states would not hesitate so long over the matter if they did not feel that they would be vitally affected by the solution adopted, and that such procedural items, while seemingly trivial, provide extremely important rallying points for public opinion and moral pressure. If genuine international constitutional order is desired, effort should be made by those interested in such a result to emphasize obligations under law, not to minimize their importance. Much could be said for the radical conservatism which would give to the Court a larger share in the operation of the security system, rather than leave this entirely in the hands of a political body, although obviously it would be impossible to make action for preventing aggression wait upon judicial decision in the first instance. League experience showed that as long as a state remained in the system at all, and refrained from throwing overboard all pretense of legality and international solidarity, legal rules and regulations had in fact well-nigh as critical an effect as in any other system of government or administration. Should the individual states involved in disputes in such situations have a veto on the action of the Council, that would, of course, be fatal to its juridical effectiveness.

When we pass to the sections of the Proposals dealing with Economic and Social Cooperation there is less need for critical discussion. The League Covenant constituted a great advance over pre-1914 international law in the attention given to such matters—the older, customary or common, international law was absurdly inadequate on this score—but the present Proposals go even further and are still more promising. They do, of course, partly reflect forms and projects developed at Geneva, particularly in the last years before the war. A few comments on their content in this field may usefully be made.

²⁶ Ch. VI, sec. C.

Thus, the position envisaged for the Economic and Social Council, subordinate to the General Assembly but independent of the Security Council, is open to serious debate. To some extent the latter might overshadow its counterpart in view of the sensational character of its functions and its Great Power element, and this would undoubtedly be regarded as unfortunate by many. The failure to classify the Economic and Social Council among the "principal organs" of the system²⁷ would tend in the same direction. On the other hand, this body would be free of any control by the Security Council, would tend to share what prestige the Assembly might acquire at the expense of that organ, and would grow in importance in proportion as economic and social matters came to be regarded as the normal and main field of activity of the Organization, perhaps just as a result of the successful functioning of the Security Council. The experience of the "non-political" branches of the League in this respect has already been noted.

The details of the Proposals for the organization and functioning of the Economic and Social Council are calculated to give it strength and effectiveness. Eighteen members elected by the Assembly, subordinate commissions as needed, technical experts on these commissions, and a permanent secretarial and administrative staff integrated with the general Secretariat of the Organization—all this is very promising and would perpetuate the best elements of League activity in this field in an entirely natural and wholesome way. Provision for majority voting, coordination of international agencies outside of the Organization—all this is likewise promising, although the absence from the powers of this Council of any legislative authority proper must be noted and two rather dubious lines of connection with the Security Council;²⁸ how much authority, for example, is the Secretary-General, a nominee of the latter, to have over the Economic and Social Council?

Finally there is proposed a general Secretariat of "such staff as may be required" (the Covenant said "such secretaries and staff as may be required").²⁹ The Secretary-General, at its head, is to be "the chief administrative officer of the Organization," although he is to have rather active relations with the political organs of the system as well. Nothing is said on numerous issues of administrative organization and technique upon which the effectiveness of the Secretariat will ultimately depend. Perhaps this is another matter left to be filled in by the general conference, which drafts the charter in accordance with the Proposals. The latter are themselves refreshingly free from bothersome detail on administrative problems.

The Proposals envisage³⁰ a process of amendment somewhat more

²⁷ Ch. 4 (1).

²⁸ Ch. 9, sec. C, par. 1 (e); Ch. 10.

²⁹ Ch. 10.

³⁰ Ch. 11.

drastic than that provided in the Covenant³¹ and by which one-third of the members of the organization might be bound against their will. Coupled with the absence of provision for withdrawal this becomes very significant. The Proposals would result in a relatively firm organization, in all but one item, with rather low degrees of authority but with provisions which would make possible unlimited increases in power if two-thirds of the nations of the world desired. It might be mentioned that here, as in one other place, the requirement is laid down for action only by the "constitutional processes" of the members;³² no effort is apparently to be made to secure action for development of the organization by any informal short cuts.

Beyond the foregoing general analysis, a number of scattered special features of the Proposals call for remark, a number of rather fundamental problems underlying the Proposals should be raised into the light, and two or three general comments may be made in closing this discussion.

Reference has already been made to the function of the Assembly to coordinate the activities of international agencies existing outside of the Organization but which it is found possible to bring into relation therewith by agreement.³³ A similar provision in the Covenant³⁴ failed to produce substantial results and the task still badly needs doing; if the new organization could succeed where the League failed, so much the better. The Proposals envisage agreements to this and with the agencies themselves; perhaps this will be a more fruitful line of attack than that provided by the Covenant (agreement with the states supporting such agencies). Finally, the reference to coordination of regional organizations under the general system seems to regard the latter as concerned solely with security;³⁵ is there to be no coordination of regional organizations in other fields? Such ("non-political") regional organizations already exist in considerable numbers and doubtless more will be created.

There is no such reference made in the Proposals to the International Labor Organization as is made to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Presumably there was no intention to suggest that the Labor Organization should be abolished, but equally there seems to have been no intention to integrate it structurally with the new organization or beyond what is mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Experience would more or less justify this grant of independent status to the Labor Organization, although such action would open

³¹ Art. XXVI.

³² Ch. 8, sec. B, par. 5.

³³ Ch. 5, sec. B, par. 7.

³⁴ Art. XXIV.

³⁵ Ch. 8, sec. C.

several new questions for settlement (future composition and election of the Governing Body, for example).

This may be the point at which to interject the observation that there is a conspicuous lack, in the Dumbarton Proposals, of any great emphasis upon humanitarian or social evolution or revolution. In the section dealing with International Economic and Social Cooperation the new organization is committed to promotion of human rights,³⁶ and this verges on very radical doctrine. But in general radical social reformers will be disappointed with the Proposals. The experience of the League would seem to indicate, however, that allowing the international organization to become the tool of one social sect or partisan grant is likely to endanger its support by the rest of the community, and even bring about its ruin, and the attitude taken at Dumbarton Oaks may be sounder than that put forward at Geneva.

And what of the other branches of the League of Nations, several of which are quite active today and all of which exist in law and embody the interests, the policies, and the desire of many nations to a significant degree? Absolutely no mention is made of the question in the Proposals, but merely creating the new Organization without further action would leave the world with two leagues of nations, and even the most devoted supporter of the cause of international organization could hardly view such a result with enthusiasm!

Similarly, nothing is said about the seat of the organization beyond an implication that it really is to have a headquarters.³⁷ The question arises with reference to the Security Council, but it arises even more practically with reference to the Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Secretariat. The question is distinctly not unimportant, moreover, from either a practical, a psychological, or a political point of view, as League experience showed. It hardly seems justifiable to attempt to appraise here the experience of the League with Geneva as a seat, however, beyond the comment that still further efforts must be made to provide any new Organization with freedom from restraint by any territorial sovereign, even in the interests of high-minded neutrality.

No provisions are contained in the Proposals regarding international action to secure revision of treaties in the interest of peace and justice, although some of the suggestions concerning international "situations" likely to lead to trouble verge on the problem of peaceful change by means other than treaty revision.³⁸ Just why this matter was omitted we are not told, but we may be perfectly sure that the

³⁶ Ch. 9, sec. A, par. 1.

³⁷ Ch. 6, sec. D, par. 1.

³⁸ Ch. 8, sec. A, par. 1.

subject can not be put aside so easily. Article XIX of the Covenant was weak and unsatisfactory, but it would have been used with considerable effect if that had been desired; in the Proposals we have nothing at all.

No pledge whatever is made for reduction of armaments on the part of members of the organization. This may be less likely to lead to misunderstanding than the promise by implication contained in the Covenant, but it remains still less of a promise. References to future regulation and possible reduction of armaments are made³⁹ but that is all.

The power to request advisory opinions on legal aspects of international disputes is to be maintained, although it is now to be confined, apparently, to the Security Council,⁴⁰ and the problem whether unanimity is, or is not, necessary for such action, which caused so much controversy in League practice, is left unsolved.

Finally, an interesting suggestion is made for suspension of members "against which preventive or enforcement action" has been "taken" (begun?).⁴¹ It was regarded as a scandal in League history when Italy remained after sanctions had been decreed and were being applied against her. On the other hand, expulsion may not seem to be necessary or desirable, even in such circumstances, and it will be remembered that withdrawal is no longer to be open to the culprit under the Proposals, as it was in cases arising under the Covenant. Much could be said in favor specifically of refusing to allow withdrawal of the aggressor state, particularly in such circumstances, but suspending the rights of a member in these cases, while leaving its obligations intact, might have some value. All this on the assumption that the nations are not yet ready to take the attitude of the normal social community where a member accused of crime is retained in his existing constitutional position, the provisions of the law for prosecution and punishment operating without modification of his status in general, and even enhancing the value of some of his rights.

Of more fundamental importance are certain general questions concerning the role of the members, as contrasted with the organs, of the new organization; the role of sanctions in the system; and the reliance upon the might of the Great Powers in contrast to world opinion as expressed very often by the smaller states.

The point to be noted on the first score is that great and frequent emphasis is placed, in the Proposals, on the obligations of the members, in contrast to the powers of the organs of the system.⁴² Now in

³⁹ Ch. 5, sec. B, par. 1; Ch. 6, sec. B, par. 5.

⁴⁰ Ch. 8, sec. A, par. 6.

⁴¹ Ch. 5, sec. B, par. 3.

⁴² Ch. 2, pars. 2, 6; ch. 8, sec. A, par. 3, and sec. B, par. 5; ch. 9.

any advanced system of organized group action and government the more important functions are turned over to the agencies of the system, to act on behalf of the members. In the League there was, perhaps, too much inclination to do this and too little emphasis placed on the obligations of members to support the organization. The Dumbarton Proposals lean over backwards in the other direction, although they leave the exact scope of the obligations of members to be decided later. This must be characterized as a reaction toward more primitive international forms; time will tell whether it is necessary and preferable to increased effort in the other direction.

In the same way the coercive action of the new organization, as pictured in the Proposals, is restricted, as already noted, to the elementary function of keeping the peace. Indirectly, League sanctions were placed behind international legal obligations of all kinds, judicial decisions, and treaty agreements.⁴³ Perhaps this was too radical. At all events, the new Proposals would take us back to the early 1900's in what they attempt to do here, plus the drastic addition of military force.

Finally, this combination of force with relative disregard of legal obligations and institutional procedures is manifested again in the reliance on the might of the Great Powers in contrast to world opinion and the moral influence of the international community. It is even implied, by some of the arrangements suggested, not only that small power opinion was insufficient to restrain aggression in League practice but also that it was positively an obstacle to effective action. At the same time there is a suggestion that the small powers might be inclined to invoke sanctioning action in an irresponsible way, although they would not, and just because they know that they would not, have to bear the main burdens of such action. This seems to be nonsense on two out of three points and rather beside the question on the third. Granted that world opinion, or small-power opinion, is inadequate to restrain madmen who are seeking world domination; is there any reason for excluding it for what it is worth, while using other measures as needed and even strengthening physical might with moral influence? Certainly the small powers—in spite of their shortcomings of timidity and weakness of one kind or another—seldom, if ever, either stood in the way of effective League action or tried to invoke it hastily. The League failed in preserving order and security because of the hostility of Germany, Italy, and Japan, the timidity and stupidity of Great Britain and France, the sectarian bias of Russia, and the criminal myopia of the United States; in other words, because of the faults of the Great Powers. The new Organization is, nevertheless, obviously planned to rest on that same basis. All that can be said

⁴³ *Covenant*, Art. XIII, par. 4, and Art. XVI, par. 2.

in comment is that, while international organization may—perhaps must—start as a tool of Great Power politics, it must be made over into something else, by the development of influence on the part of other nations and relaxation of their privileges by the Great Powers—although this process took place so rapidly in the case of the League of Nations in the 1920's that, in combination with certain other factors, it had very unfortunate results.

It may well be worth while to interject here one last point which, like others, appears to be only a verbal difference but actually represents something deeper. The Proposals point to the adoption of a "Charter" for the new international organization. It may be recalled that the term "constitution" was deliberately avoided when the League of Nations was established and the term "covenant" adopted instead, in order to placate or appease the foes of the superstate or world state. Other international organizations have not, in the intervening years, felt it necessary to be quite so cautious and have actually said the noxious word. The present Proposals remain on the safe side, while, perhaps, recalling also the Atlantic Charter. At all events, the term "Charter" arises above the somewhat mystical and inchoate connotations of "Covenant" and stands right next door to "Constitution," as any American familiar with the evolution of state government in this country will be well aware.

It is hoped that the above analysis does not appear unduly critical of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Many of the items in those Proposals seem admirable and many others normal and sound and calling for little or no comment. It is only the provisions which seem reactionary or backward, in comparison with features of the League of Nations system, or the provisions which, on the contrary, seem to strike out distinctly in advance of the League system, that have been emphasized in this discussion. The former seem to exceed the latter somewhat in mere numbers, although opinions would differ concerning the relative importance of various items, and we must remember that several matters are still under consideration and are due to be added later. This may remedy a number of the shortcomings cited a moment ago—concerning existing League services, seat of the organization, revision of treaties, reduction of armaments, and so on—not to mention other matters, such as registration and publication of treaties, and the very important question of international supervision over the government of dependencies. Of course, it is also true that the additions made on these matters may make things worse, but in this situation we shall follow the principle of thinking and speaking no evil of the unborn. All that we can say at present is that as they have been given to the world the Dumbarton Oaks proposals are inferior and incomplete in comparison with the system of the League of Nations in most mat-

ters while being distinctly more advanced on one or two points, namely, probable effective military sanctions, abandonment of the principle of unanimity, and of the right of withdrawal, and a more radical system of amendment.

Oddly enough, the reply which would probably be made to such an appraisal—which has already been made in certain quarters—cuts in two directions. It is replied that, if the new Proposals do not go as far as the League system went in some matters—the guarantee and procedures of Articles X to XVI, especially—this is an improvement because the League system was ahead of the times, in advance of public opinion, and therefore unworkable. But if that was true, it is likely to be true for the more radical features of the Dumbarton Proposals also, unless opinion has greatly changed in the interval—and in that case the first point also falls! Probably further speculation along this line would be unprofitable at the moment.

One thing seems certain, however—namely, that if any general system of international organization is desired after the present war it must be sought under the terms of the Dumbarton Proposals, completed and improved upon as much as possible. It is now clear that we are not going back to the League of Nations, even a revised League of Nations, certainly not on the political side, although it is amusing, if nothing more, to see references to the projected organization in quite friendly but also quite detached sources under the name of "the new League of Nations." It is clear also that we are not going to be offered anything in the way of a close federal union or world state (although the Proposals would produce a low-grade federation in fact, as did the Covenant), or that there is the chance for improvisation of any other new and elaborate system. It behooves us, therefore, to put forward all possible improvements for the present Proposals whether drawn from League experience or any other source and make the best we can out of them.





